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ABSTRACT
This study constitutes the fourth phase of a research program designed to explore 
the factors that influence the choices people make regarding deceptive 
communication. The research program leading up to this study produced five 
factors o f deceptive communication— acceptance o f deception, ethics, motives, 
intentionality, and upbringing— that may represent the thoughts people have about 
communication, which in turn may influence when one deceives, who is deceived 
and how deceptive messages are formulated. By applying the Theory o f Planned 
Behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1988; Ajzen & Madden, 1986), this study determines the 
extent to which these five constructs constitute a mental conceptualization of 
deception. In addition, this study intends to determine the internal consistency and 
dimensional structure o f the factors confirmed through this project. The results of 
this study will have several implications, including future studies examining how 
this relationship makes a link between one’s attitudes about deception and one’s 
actual deceptive behaviors. This report reviews relevant literature, outlines the 
methods carried out in this study, reports the findings, and discusses the 
limitations and implications o f the findings.
CHAPTER I 
Introduction
All men [sic] are bom truthful, and die liars.
— Vauvenarges
A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons o f explanations.
—Saki
People are often confronted with situations in which they must choose 
their words carefully. Individuals making that choice often must weigh the 
objective o f conveying accurate and veracious information against the need to 
preserve that relationship or to save face (McComack, 1992). When individuals 
wish to be truthful, these two goals may seem incompatible. In order to resolve 
this incompatibility, one objective is often forsaken for the other, which often 
means that the intent to preserve face and maintain the relationships wins out.
Communicators make these decisions constantly, some when they “fudge’ 
on their income tax returns, others when they lie about their sexual history to a 
prospective dating parmer (Pawlowski & Dunbar, 1999). Such decisions may 
involve judging whether the target can be duped, whether the deceiver will enjoy 
lying, or if  the deceiver can morally justify deceiving the target. These are 
examples o f the thoughts people may have when they are confronted with a 
situation in which they feel uncomfortable telling the truth. The thoughts people 
have as they are plaiming and formulating their messages are influenced by such 
things as one’s social motives, upbringing, ethical stance, awareness of one’s
communicative behaviors, or perceptions o f  the acceptance of deception (O’Hair 
& Cody, 1994; Scholl, 1999; Scholl & O’Hair, 1998). Influences such as these 
have a powerful impact on how truthful or deceptive that person is (Rowatt, 
Cunningham, & Druen, 1998) in a given situation.
While people often frown on deception in general, research indicates that 
people feel compelled to commit deceptive acts at least once or twice a day 
(Duller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996; Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; DePaulo, 
Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; O’Hair & Cody, 1994; Scholl & 
O ’Hair, 1998). According to Buller and Burgoon (1994), ’’Society and most 
conversations rest on an assumption of veracity in information exchange . . .  In 
actual practice, though, communicators frequently decide that honesty is not the 
best strategy” (p. 191). In fact, Buller and Burgoon (1996) found that at least one 
quarter of all conversations they studied contained some element of deception or 
suspected deception. Furthermore, many individuals see deception as a useful, 
often necessary part o f  their communication repertoire. Not only do individuals 
view deception as an efficient solution to many interpersonal communication 
problems (Camden et al., 1984; Deetz, 1990), but they see it as an adaptive 
strategy essential for survival against such issues as face threats, punishments, 
embarrassing situations, loss of material things, and harm toward themselves and 
others (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo et al., 1993; Goffman, 1974; McLaughlin, 
Cody, & O’Hair, 1983; O’Hair & Cody, 1994; Robinson, Shepherd, & Heywood, 
1998).
Many studies have attempted to increase our understanding of 
interpersonal deception by examining the verbal and nonverbal cues that signal 
deception (e.g., Buller & Aune, 1987; Buller, Comstock, Aune, & Strzyzewski, 
1989; Ekman, 1985; Hocking & Leathers, 1980; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 
1975; Vrij, Semlin, & Bull, 1996; Zuckerman, Spiegel, DePaulo, & Rosenthal,
1982), and by attempting to conceptualize and operationalize the act (Hopper & 
Bell, 1984; Rowatt, Cunningham, & Druen, 1999). Studies of the 1970s and 
1980s in particular have addressed deception cues by studying arousal, emotion, 
and social cognition in order to understand the true nature o f deception, how it 
may be linked to communicative behavior (e.g., Greene, O’Hair, Cody, & Yen, 
1985; Levine & McComack, 1996), and what behaviors successful deceivers 
display (Riggio, Tucker, & Widaman, 1987).
Recently, researchers such as Buller and Burgoon (1994; 1996) and 
McComack and colleagues (McComack, 1992; McComack, Levine, Solowczuk, 
Torres, & Campbell, 1992; Yeung, Levine, & Nishiyama, 1999) have answered 
the call for more theoretically based studies by attempting to leam more about the 
process o f deception and determine what constructs lead to deceptive behavior. 
More specifically, researchers (Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; O'Hair & Cody, 
1994; McComack, 1992, 1997) have provided models o f and theoretical 
explanations for deceptive behavior by identifying the possible underlying 
mechanisms or factors that contribute to deceptive communication.
Perhaps the most visible developing theory of deception is Buller and 
Burgoon’s (1996; Buller et al., 1994; Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger, 1996;
Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, & Rockwell, 1996) interpersonal deception theory 
(IDT). Buller and Burgoon (1996) claim that deception involves a mutual, 
interdependent relationship between the deceiver and the target, and they suggest 
that there is a multiple-step process that shapes and influences the interaction 
between both deceivers and targets. In general, IDT locates an interpersonal 
deception encounter between two actors, and embedded within that encounter are 
pre-interaction aspects that influence communication outcomes. Moreover, 
'receiver cognitions and behaviors influence subsequent sender cognitions and 
behaviors . . .  which feed into subsequent receiver adjustments” (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996, p. 211). Finally, the resulting deceptive encounter leads to post­
interaction cognitions and thoughts, which will influence future deceptive 
encounters.
Buller and Burgoon (1996) identify and test constructs they claim 
influence the deception encounter. Such constructs are classified as pre­
interaction (e.g., personal background, relational history, communication 
repertoire), interaction (e.g., suspicion, behavioral leakage, behavioral 
adjustments), and post-interaction (e.g., perceived deception success, deception 
detection). IDT also offers several propositions that attempt to address the 
relationship among common deception variables (e.g., suspicion, nonverbal 
leakage, and relational history). An additional facet of IDT is that deceivers 
engage in information management that requires attention to environmental 
stimuli and careful execution of certain verbal and nonverbal tactics (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon et al., 1996).
Despite IDT’s attempts to make deception research more explanatory and 
theoretical, IDT has had plenty of criticism. McComack (1997), for example, 
argues that IDT’s propositions do not address the mechanisms and processes 
leading to the decoding and encoding o f deceptive messages, and that many of 
IDT’s claims are unfalsifiable (Levine & McComack, 1996b; McComack, 1997). 
Stiff (1996) and DePaulo et al. (1996) argue that IDT does not present a unifying 
causal mechanism or group of mechanisms that shape the deceptive interaction. 
Perhaps the harshest criticisms of IDT make reference to the methods used to test 
the theory. DePaulo et al. (1996) point out that the results foimd in the IDT 
studies could have been a product of their complicated experimental designs, 
particularly in the way research participants were asked to formulate excessively 
elaborate messages, which may be shaped by very elaborately fabricated 
treatment conditions and manipulations. In examining the common critiques of 
IDT, one may conclude that this theory has not really reached “theory” status 
(Stiff, 1996), or that it still does not contribute significantly to the deception 
literature.
The previous discussion illustrates the deception literature has yet to 
demonstrate predictive and explanatory power consistently. In particular, the 
literature has been unsuccessful in identifying the factors or predispositions that 
influence the way people shape and execute their deceptive messages. Perhaps 
this is because deception research has mostly been concerned with solving 
practical problems rather than developing theoretical postulates that “identify
behavioral correlates of truthful and deceptive communication” (Stiff, 1996, p. 
295).
One could look to potential reasons for the dearth of viable deception 
theory outlining deceptive constructs, one o f which may be the strictly deceiver- 
or target-sided perspective many deception studies have employed. For example, 
Buller and Burgoon (1996) argue that most social scientific research has 
employed noninteractive scenarios in which deceivers (confederates designated to 
this role) formulate messages to be read at a later time by their targets. This 
approach has been said to disregard the interactive nature of deceptive 
commimication. This approach also focuses mainly on the effect on a target and 
not on the factors that influenced the way the deceiver constructed his or her 
message.
An additional reason for the lack o f viable theories may be that deception 
studies are still, by and large, measuring intent to deceive, rather than actual 
deceptive behaviors. For example, in Neuliep and Mattson’s (1990) study, about 
one-half o f their respondents were asked to write about what they would say to 
another person to make that person comply with a request, while the other half 
were asked to write out what they would say without disclosing the real reason for 
the request. In other words, this study examined people’s intentions o f what they 
would say in a future interaction that called for compliance from another person.
One way to overcome these limitations is to approach deception from a 
more cognitive perspective. According to Greene (1984), cognition is “most 
closely associated with the information processing approach to mind, which
assumes a sequence o f structures and processes linking inputs to the processing 
system with the outputs of that system” (Greene, 1984, p. 241). An understanding 
o f these inputs and outputs allows us to describe and explain the processes that 
produce or lead to certain behaviors. Cognitive approaches attempt to develop 
falsifiable (Stiff, 1996), powerful theories that apply to a wide range o f contexts 
(Greene, 1984). What makes these approaches so widely applicable is that their 
ultimate objective is to determine underlying causal mechanisms that are common 
across many phenomena (DePaulo, Ansfield, & Bell, 1996a; Greene, 1984). The 
identification o f such causal mechanisms may provide a springboard from which 
to propose and test viable predictions of deceptive behavior that are truly 
representative o f “real life” and of the way people think about deception.
A cognitive approach can tell us many things about how mere thoughts 
and cognitions lead to communicative behavior:
[The foremost assumption of a cognitive approach] is that o f an active, 
purposeful organism capable of formulating behavioral alternatives and 
choosing among those alternatives on the basis of expected outcomes . . .
A second assumption, which represents an extension of the first, is that the 
individual acts upon the basis of the meanings which s/he assigns to 
stimuli and social situations. (Greene, 1984, p. 242)
Based on this cognitive approach, people do not engage in deception merely for 
its own sake. Rather, deception is often a strategy individuals use when serving 
their own or others’ goals or when reacting to a situation (Dillard & Schrader, 
1999; Schrader & Dillard, 1999). For the potential deceiver, there may be a
process or several processes that lead deceivers from mere thoughts they have 
about deception toward an actual deceptive message. What makes this a 
communication problem is that knowledge of common thoughts people have 
when they consider deceiving may give us insight into developing the type of 
process models that explain and illustrate a “speaker’s ability to lead the listener 
to a predefined thought or action” (Deetz, 1990, p. 230). For example, such a 
model may inform us of the direction in which one mentally progresses from one 
thought to another (e.g., ethics, importance of one’s relationship to the target), or 
may inform us, based on the situation, which thought or thoughts will stand out as 
more important influences o f deceptive behavior.
The attention to such thoughts and their potential relationship within such 
a process model says something about deception as a decision-making strategy 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996; O’Hair & Cody, 1994; Scholl & O’Hair, 1998). 
Much like other forms of communication, deception serves a purpose (Goffman, 
1974) that is motivated by people’s needs and wants. These words and tactics 
stem from thoughts motivated by our perceptions of the situation, needs, and 
wants that generated them. What would add to our understanding of deception as 
a communication activity is knowing whether there is a set of deception-related 
thoughts that people have, and whether one or more thoughts take on more 
importance than others in particular situations. Having an understanding of the set 
of thoughts or factors that shape our encoding o f deceptive messages may shed 
light on why people deceive others, when they do it and under what conditions.
what types o f deception they engage in, and who they believe are the best targets 
of deception.
An important step in understanding the thoughts that influence deceptive 
communication is to articulate “a set o f  constructs that are likely to be important 
to our understanding of the phenomenon o f interest” (DePaulo et al., 1996, p.
297), which is deception. An identification and understanding o f these constructs, 
or factors, may tell us something about how deceptive decision-making is 
accomplished. This approach would view these identifiable factors as those 
representing the predispositions that move people to communicate in certain 
ways. Beyond the initial identification of these factors, it would then be 
informative to leam how these factors are related to each other to mediate the 
specific deceptive behaviors in which individuals engage (Buller & Burgoon, 
1994).
The main implication here is that deception research would benefit greatly 
from the development of sound theoretical models that identify the factors 
underlying deceptive behavior and “make accurate predictions about the 
outcomes o f future observations” (DePaulo et al., 1996, p. 298). Tliere is a crucial 
need for a more cognitive approach to studying deception that moves the 
scholarship above and beyond mere speculation about certain aspects of deception 
(Hyman, 1989) toward identifying the communication-related structures that 
shape the deceptive messages we transmit. Just as Seiter (1997) proposed a model 
that reveals people’s constructs o f events that help them make judgments of 
veracity and deceptiveness, this approach would add to our overall understanding
of the link between deceivers’ factors (or communicative predispositions) and 
actual communicative behaviors (Prislin & Kovrlija, 1992).
To respond to this need, the current study was intended to be the fourth 
phase o f a research program designed to test the existence of the factors that serve 
as the link between thoughts or cognitions about deception and actual deceptive 
communication (Scholl & O’Hair, 1998’). In addition, this study sets out to verify 
that the factors emerging from this study are unidimensional and internally 
consistent. The results of such a study could serve as a springboard for future 
investigations, such as those that test the relationship among these factors, as well 
as those that make predictions of people’s deceptive behaviors as influenced by 
such factors.
Before proceeding with this study, the previous stages of this research 
program should be explained. In the first phase o f this program, the author and a 
colleague (Scholl & O’Hair, 1998) conducted focus groups in an attempt to 
understand people’s deception-related thoughts and perceptions, or more simply, 
“what they think about when they think about deception”. This phase was 
intended to be very inductive and emically-derived. Rather than infer information 
from observable behavior, Scholl and O’Hair (1998) chose to explore 
intrapersonal issues of deception by conducting the focus group interviews in 
order to gather deception-related thoughts from individuals themselves. Through a 
constant-comparative analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990), Scholl and O’Hair discovered 17 frequently occurring categories
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emerging from the group discussions about communication and deception (see 
Scholl & O’Hair, 1998).
In a subsequent phase included in that study, Scholl and O’Hair (1998) 
submitted the 17 themes to an exploratory factor analysis from which eight 
themes emerged. These themes were further tested through another exploratory 
factor analysis (the third phase—Scholl, 1999), which yielded four retained 
factors— upbringing/background, motives, acceptance o f deception, and 
intentionality.
The purpose of the current study is to determine through more systematic 
means the factors influencing individuals’ deceptive communication, and to 
generate a set of factors that are unidimensional in nature. Along with the four 
previously mentioned factors, a fifth one—ethics—will be tested. Ethics has been 
addressed at length in the focus groups (Scholl & O’Hair, 1998) as well in some 
of the deception literature (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Deetz, 1990; O’Hair & 
Cody, 1994). It is for these reasons that this factor has been added to the current 
investigation.
A theoretical approach that provides a viable framework for this and 
subsequent studies is Ajzen’s (1985, 1988) theory o f planned behavior (TPB), 
which attempts to explain the link between attitudes and behavior. The TPB is an
extension o f the theory of reasoned action (TRA Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980;
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which has a limitation in dealing with people’s 
behaviors over which they have incomplete volitional control (Ajzen, 1985,1988; 
Kurland, 1995; Prislin & Kovrlija, 1992; Raats, Shepherd, & Sparks, 1995).
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According to TPB, actual behaviors can be predicted from one’s intentions 
to perform the behavior, which is mediated by subjective norms, attitudes toward 
the behavior, and perceived behavioral control (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Doll & 
Ajzen, 1992). Conner and Armitage (1998) point out that both TRA and TPB 
were designed to predict how information and motives could influence behavior. 
However, while TRA assumes that perceived behavioral control is completely 
mediated by intention, which directly influences actual behavior, TPB considers 
the possibility o f a direct link between perceived behavioral control and behavior 
(Ajzen & Madden, 1986).
Such a theoretical perspective may shed light on the attitude-behavior 
relationship with regard to the identification o f factors or predispositions 
underlying communication within deceptive contexts. TPB and TRA attempt to 
identify specific constructs or causal mechanisms that illustrate how certain 
cognitions work together to influence behavior. As will be discussed later, TPB 
illustrates specific relationships among its components and predicts causal links 
between certain constructs. This approach is in keeping with the current study 
because o f its emphasis on antecedent constructs, the relationship among these 
antecedents, and how they ultimately lead to the formulation and transmission o f 
certain messages. The TPB is not being applied here for its predictive purposes, 
but as a model that addresses thoughts and constructs that eventually guide the 
choices people make when carrying out their communicative behaviors. Also, the 
constructs or factors identified in the TPB have interesting similarities to the 
factors being tested in this study; these similarities will be discussed later on.
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Keeping this general theoretical framework in mind, this study was 
intended to test the viability of five deception-related factors—acceptance of 
deception, ethics, intentionality, motives, and upbringing. Thoughts such as these 
eventually may be shown to capture adequately the thoughts and cognitions 
people have that influence their deceptive practices. The understanding gained 
from this study could have far-reaching implications for deception research from 
both a theoretical and practical standpoint. First, this study may serve as a 
springboard for making predictions about deceptive communication based on the 
knowledge of individuals’ commonly held thoughts and perceptions about 
deceptive communication. Furthermore, this type o f  theory building may lead to 
the discovery o f certain mechanisms that exist across various deception 
encounters. This implication may pave the way for the possibility of a unifying 
deception theory that is generalizable and falsifiable (Buller & Burgoon, 1996a; 
DePaulo et al., 1996; McComack, 1997; Stiff, 1996). The identification o f 
deceptive factors and the subsequent test of their relationship also increase the 
application o f such theoretical frameworks as the Theory of Planned Behavior. 
Such a framework would contain a viable set o f  thoughts or predispositions that 
represent a construct underlying a communication behavior across a wide variety 
o f situations.
In terms of applied and practical implications, knowledge o f a set o f 
identifiable predispositions influencing deceptive communication eventually may 
increase people’s ability to predict others’ deceptive attempts, or to understand 
better their own deceptive tendencies. For example, knowledge of the constructs
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that exist in a deceptive encounter may be useful in workplace settings. For 
example, relatively successful attempts have already been made through the 
development of the Reid Report (Ash, 1971; Cunningham, Wong, & Barbee, 
1994; Rowatt et al., 1998; Sackett & Harris, 1984), which is widely used to 
predict employees’ tendencies to lie, cheat, and steal. In general, a viable 
theoretical framework that outlines core deceptive constructs may help 
individuals foresee the deceptive tendencies of others, help them know what 
thoughts weigh heavily in the minds of their communicative partners, and 
increase their ability to protect themselves from harmful deceptive activities based 
on what they know about the persons deceiving them.
To accomplish its current purpose and to provide a basis for future studies 
that will help scholars and laypeople better understand the nature o f deceptive 
communication, this study addresses the five deceptive factors identified in 
previous phases of this program and reviews the literature behind them. Next, this 
report outlines the research questions guiding this study and the methods that will 
be used to answer these questions. After revealing the results, this report discusses 
the findings, identifies the study’s limitations, and draws implications for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
In order to explore the factors that influence deceptive communication, 
this report first reviews the deception literature pertaining to the factors currently 
under investigation—acceptability of deception, ethics, intentionality, motives, 
and upbringing. What follows is a discussion of the theoretical framework that 
provides the rationale and direction for this study.
Factors of Deceptive Communication
Before presenting a discussion of the factors influencing deceptive 
communication, an explication o f deception as a concept is necessary. Many 
scholars have set out to provide definitions o f deception that are inclusive of a 
variety o f behaviors. For example, Buller and Burgoon (1996) define deception as 
"a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or 
conclusion by the receiver" (p. 205). Also, deception has been viewed by most 
researchers as an intentional act deceivers knowingly commit (Buller & Burgoon, 
1994, 1996a; Camden et al., 1984; Ekman, 1985; Greene et al., 1985; Hample, 
1980; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; O'Hair & Cody, 1994). Defining deception as 
an intentional activity may imply that deceivers use communication to adapt to 
their changing environment or social conditions, or that they use deception to 
accomplish certain communicative objectives. This type o f definition also implies 
that unintentional lies cannot really be defined as lies at all, an issue that will 
receive further discussion later on.
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In order to conceptualize deception, some scholars (Bavelas, Black, 
Chovii, & Muilett, 1990; Camden et al., 1984; Eisenberg, 1984; Hopper & Bell,
1984; Knapp, Hart, & Dennis, 1974; O'Hair & Cody, 1994) have formulated and 
tested various types, such as lies (Hopper & Bell, 1984), exaggerations (DePaulo 
& Bell, 1996; Hopper & Bell, 1984), "white" lies (Camden et al., 1984), 
equivocation and ambiguity (Bavelas et al., 1990; Eisenberg, 1984), “crimes” 
(Hopper & Bell, 1984), and jokes (Hopper & Bell, 1984) in order to capture 
deception as it exists across several contexts. While typologies may help identify 
the extent to which deceptive acts depart from the truth, categories tell us little 
about the underlying mechanisms behind deceptive acts. Furthermore, many types 
o f deception appearing in the literature were formulated by researchers who 
consulted dictionaries or formulated the categories themselves before testing 
them, rather than consulting the individuals to whom those results are generalized 
(see, for example. Hopper & Bell, 1984). Although these types have been tested 
and generalized to the population, it is difficult to say whether these typologies 
truly reflect the thoughts or conceptualizations with which people operate when 
they rationalize or engage in a deceptive act.
After considering the research that has attempted to conceptualize and 
define deception, this study presents a more general definition: Deception is the 
act, motivated by past knowledge or upbringing, motives, ethics, and subjective 
norms, in which a person, having some level o f intentionality, attempts to draw 
the target away from what the deceiver believes to be true. This definition sets the 
agenda for the rest o f this report in that it incorporates the five factors to be tested
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in this study. The following is a discussion of these five factors and the theoretical 
framework used to rationalize their study.
Upbringing. One factor under consideration is the upbringing or 
background of individuals and how this influences when and how they deceive 
others. Upbringing is referred to as an individual’s set of habits, communicative 
behaviors, or typical reactions to situations as learned from parents, mentors, and 
other influential persons. Upbringing consists of the collection of past experiences 
and “lessons” that individuals collect and carry with them toward future 
encounters. These past experiences and lessons learned from important others 
have a large hand in shaping people’s abilities and likelihood to deceive. For 
example. Cole and Mitchell (1998) assessed children’s ability to be convincing in 
an act of deception. Their results suggest that there are significant associations 
between family background and deceptive ability. An example of this type of 
association is if parents are able to display nonverbal cues that make them appear 
credible, then it is likely that their children will acquire these abilities and use 
them successfully. The traits and behaviors that individuals have are very much a 
product o f what they learn from their parents or caretakers, peers, and educational 
experiences. These traits and behaviors have most likely been tried and/or 
confirmed in prior interactions, which are subsequently stored in one’s repertoire 
for future use (Wood, 1993).
Another way to look at upbringing is to consider parents’ or influential 
others’ opinions or reasons for deception and to know whether or not these 
aspects carry over to the person under influence. Upbringing, as it is seen from
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this perspective, emerged from the Scholl and O’Hair (1998) focus group 
participants, who identified upbringing as an important influence on the reasons 
people engage in deception. In fact, these focus group participants found it quite 
easy to talk about what parents, school, and peers taught them about lying and 
fibbing. This suggests that people receive many messages as they develop their 
background information. Some people who are influential to us tell us that 
deception can be hurtful, while others teach us how to get what we want more 
easily by avoiding or altering the truth (O’Hair & Cody, 1994).
Upbringing can have a tremendous impact on one’s view of deception 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Cole & Mitchell, 1998; O’Hair & Cody, 1994; Scholl 
& O’Hair, 1998). Wood (1993) points out that communicators do not "come to an 
encounter with a blank slate” (Wood, 1993, p. 69); they bring to the interaction 
those traits and behaviors that have worked for them in the past. Communicators 
leant to attach certain communicative behaviors with certain aspects o f the 
situation (e.g., type of situation involved, affinity towards potential target, 
environment, emotional climate) in order to formulate an effective and 
appropriate message (Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996).
Research suggests that upbringing shapes a person’s communication 
skills, particularly those that relate to communicative competence (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984). "Those with greater 
communication skills and greater self-monitoring are better able to minimize 
leakage, increase facial animation and head movements, increase verbal fluency, 
increase eye contact, use more "we" pronouns, and present a believable lie"
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(Buller & Burgoon, 1994, p. 217). Perhaps one’s upbringing provides 
opportunities for developing and fine-tuning certain skills that lead to success in 
communicative competence or success in deception, which enables people to get 
what they want out of their interactions with others.
Also, it would be reasonable that character or personality is at least in part 
shaped by one’s upbringing, and these aspects as well influence what type o f 
deceiver a person is. These characteristics, in conjunction with certain personality 
traits, such as Machiavellianism (O'Hair & Cody, 1987, 1994), self- and other- 
serving tendencies (Goffinan, 1974; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996), or the amount of 
trust put in others’ action (Wrightsman, 1964, 1974) are learned from others to a 
certain extent. They not only influence a deceiver's behavior or tactical choices, 
but also may be present in the minds of individuals who may be targets o f 
deception.
However prevalent this development is in one’s upbringing, what people 
have learned in the past often does not help them resolve their conflicting feelings 
between their general attitude toward deception and their willingness to engage in 
it. This type of mental struggle could be a partial product o f what individuals are 
told by people who teach and influence them, and it also could be a product o f 
what these individuals see others do. The point here is that people acquire certain 
characteristics, traits, and beliefs, and learn what communicative behaviors should 
match those beliefs in a given situation. Sometimes this matching of traits to 
behaviors will lead to the truth; at other times, it will result in some form o f 
deception.
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Ethics. Having discussed upbringing as a factor, this brings us to a related 
factor, which is ethics. Ethics is defined as the values, moral principles, and 
beliefs that guide people’s communicative behavior. Ethics is what an individual 
currently possesses, and which may be in constant flux as one undergoes novel 
experiences.
The ethics factor is included here partly because of the prevalence of 
ethics statements emerging in the original focus group interviews (Scholl & 
O ’Hair, 1998), and because deception is often an emotionally-charged issue 
fueled by discussions and debates over when it is right or wrong, appropriate or 
inappropriate, or even justifiable (Backbier, Hoogstraten, & Terwogt- 
Kouwenhoven, 1997; Deetz, 1990; O’Hair & Cody, 1994). Also, for purposes of 
this study, ethics is considered a personal issue, meaning that ethics is viewed 
here as the factor that represents an individual’s own beliefs, principles, or values 
o f deception being right or wrong, and is considered to be different, although not 
interdependent with others’ views of what is right or wrong about deception. 
Perhaps the most important reason for including ethics is that, while it is a 
ubiquitous topic within deception-related writings and discussions (Backbier et 
al., 1997; Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Deetz, 1990; O’Hair & Cody, 1994), it is 
rarely included as an observed or measured construct in deception-related studies 
and experiments. This study is an attempt to account for a variable or factor that is 
often written about, but not as often considered, observed, or measured, in very 
systematic ways.
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Scholars agree that people experience dissonance when they perceive a 
necessity to engage in deception (Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, & Grandpre, 1996). 
Hample (1980) explains:
The typical liar is tom by a felt need to lie on one hand and by the force of 
social proscription on the other. A consistent finding . . .  is that liars are . .
. substantially more satisfied with the lie than with themselves . . .  The liar 
knows that lies should not be told at all and so lies only when rewards are 
both assured and large, (p. 45)
This culture has a general negative view of lying (Deetz, 1990; O'Hair & 
Cody, 1994; Sims, 1992; Smith, 1988). Individuals normally expect that the 
people with whom they interact will be honest and sincere, and they often enter 
into a relationship with the expectation that they will be able to trust their 
relational partners (Burgoon et al., 1996). Deetz (1990) argues that this reliance 
on trust is important for effective and appropriate communication. He also claims 
that if people think deception will obstruct the shared meaning or quality o f the 
message, then deception would be undesirable. This is because, according to 
Deetz ( 1990), lying obstructs the communicator-receiver relationship that leads to 
shared meanings. In addition, Kant (1964; 1996) has argued that lying violates 
maxims that are necessary for living. One particular maxim, the categorical 
imperative, states that if people are contemplating a particular action, they must 
decide whether they would have other people engage in that action, especially if 
that action is done toward them. If  so, then that action is permissible; if not, they 
should avoid it (Rachels, 1993).
2 1
Not everyone views deception in this manner; many individuals subscribe 
to perspectives that allow them to justify deceiving others. One such perspective, 
ethical subjectivism, posits that our moral opinions are based on the feelings we 
happen to experience (Rachels, 1993). Because a universal rule may not 
adequately represent an individual's personal feelings, communicators must look 
internally for the reason or motivation behind a potentially deceptive act. Based 
on the selfishness or selflessness of one's feelings, the communicator may decide 
whether or not the act truly represents the feeling, not necessarily something that 
is imiversally true or false. Another perspective, utilitarianism, stipulates that 
whenever we have a choice among various courses of action, we should pursue 
the action that promotes the best possible consequences for everyone involved 
(Rachels, 1993). When attempting to justify deception, "the only thing that 
matters is the amount of happiness or unhappiness that is caused. Everything else 
is irrelevant" (Rachels, 1993, p. 102). Based on this view, weighing all the 
possible consequences may allow one to conclude that deception is the most 
advantageous strategy to use in a given situation.
However justifiable some forms of deception seem to be, some scholars 
ask whether deception is merely a form of convenient communication rather than 
a wisely chosen act. According to Camden et al. (1984), "[We often find 
ourselves] treating the lie as the most efficient solution to interpersonal 
communication problems" (p. 309). The choice to deceive may be guided by the 
selfish objective o f the communicator, rather than any personal belief about what 
is right or wrong. Furthermore, an individual may not want to put forth the
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cognitive effort required to formulate a truthful message that is both effective and 
appropriate; therefore, a person may lie if  it is easier or more convenient than 
telling the truth, not because it is the right thing to do. Issues such as these need 
more exploration, and the determination o f ethics as an exclusively distinct 
category may shed light on the role o f  ethics in deception-related communication.
Motives. The next factor under examination is motives. Motives are 
defined here as reasons underlying deceptive activities. To make this factor more 
distinct from the other factors, this study views motives as a group o f  reasons or 
motivations that are tied to the situation or the other person with whom one 
interacts. Motives are not necessarily concerned with personal attitudes or morals, 
but with how one’s actions will coincide or conflict with the situation or the 
target.
Goffinan (1974) identifies two motivational types of deception: Benign 
fabrications are based on the interests o f the person being deceived. If  they do not 
directly interest the receiver, the deception at least does not work against that 
person. Exploitive fabrications, on the other hand, are those which serve the 
interests of the deceiver and may produce harmful consequences for the target.
Individuals may have several reasons to deceive others, but some scholars 
suggest that motives fall into one of two categories: self-orientation or other- 
orientation. On the one hand, deceivers may choose to deceive because the act of 
lying will directly benefit themselves, i.e., self-oriented deception (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; Goffinan, 1974; O ’Hair & Cody, 1994). Such cases may 
include omitting information that may embarrassment the deceiver, twisting facts
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to avoid punishment or sanctions, or providing false information to gain a tangible 
benefit.
Conversely, other-oriented deception involves deceiving a target in such a 
way that will benefit that target (Goffinan, 1974). Examples include saving the 
target’s face or avoiding hurting the target’s feelings (Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 
1996a; O’Hair & Cody, 1994). Although some lies and deceptive acts may have 
the purpose o f hurting others:
Lies do not appear to be an aggressive weapon in competitive or 
threatening exchanges. Instead, they appear to be a (successful) answer to 
a challenge. Assuming that challenges are more likely to come from 
dominant interactants, the typically responsive nature o f lies underscores 
their usually self-defensive purposes. (Hample, 1980, p. 45)
Despite the convenience o f  placing all deceptive motives in either self­
oriented or other-oriented categories, many aspects underlying deceptive motives 
deserve closer examination. For instance, the nature and intimacy level o f a 
relationship often motivates people. It has been found that lies are told more often 
in casual relationships than in close ones (Burgoon et al., 1996). DePaulo and Bell 
(1996) present somewhat contradictory information when they suggest that people 
who are called on for feedback or criticism by someone they liked tend to use 
deception to prevent hurting that person. In their study, DePaulo and Bell (1996) 
argue that this happens more often with close interactants than with those not as 
well liked. These studies suggest that, while deception itself is viewed as a 
negative activity, it may be perceived as an effective tool for maintaining or
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salvaging close relationships, sparing others’ feelings and face (Buller &
Burgoon, 1994; DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; O’Hair & Cody, 
1994), or providing some benefit to the other person (O’Hair & Cody, 1994; 
Buller & Burgoon, 1994).
In addition to the nature of a relationship, the deception literature suggests 
that the consideration of positive and negative consequences may influence 
whether or not people engage in deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Camden et 
al., 1984; Deetz, 1990; Hample, 1980; Lippard, 1988; O'Hair & Cody, 1994). 
Therefore, they are included here and viewed as motives of a “post-interaction” 
nature. According to O’Hair and Cody (1994), there is less current research that 
addresses consequences of deception. They claim that many deceptive attempts 
start out as positive or altruistic motives, but may lead to negative results. Truths 
can damage relationships, and this damage can either be subtle or catastrophic.
For example, a spouse’s motive to hide an adulterous affair may be that she/he 
does not want to jeopardize the marriage or hurt the other spouse’s feelings. What 
is important about consequences is that we do not know exactly when they will 
come about, we cannot predict the circumstances under which those consequences 
may emerge, and it is very difficult to know, until after the fact, the amount o f 
damage the discovered deception can cause (O’Hair & Cody, 1994). If 
consequences seem to be difficult to predict or foresee, potential deceivers may 
decide that the truth is the best choice to make. Another reason to avoid deception 
is that the consequences themselves are inherently negative.
25
The literature consistently points out certain negative consequences o f 
deception. One consequence is that deceivers may feel guilty about their 
dishonesty or lose self-respect (Deetz, 1990). Also, when the deceiver is detected, 
he or she may lose the target's respect as well (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Deetz, 
1990; O'Hair & Cody, 1994). Perhaps the most serious negative consequence is 
the obstruction o f the communicator-receiver relationship, which prevents the true 
sharing of meaning between both deceiver and receiver (Deetz, 1990). Overall, if 
consequences such these are too great, the deceiver may conclude that deception 
may be more trouble than it is worth. The perceived negative consequences of 
deception may serve as a significant motive for someone to stick to the truth.
There are positive consequences o f deception as well, which may serve as 
a motive to engage in the act. First, deception may benefit the deceiver in that 
punishment o f or harm toward an individual may be avoided (Camden et al.,
1984; Hample, 1980; O'Hair & Cody, 1994). Second, some individuals may see 
deception as a way to improve a relationship or avoid conflict (Camden et al.,
1984), especially if being completely truthful is seen as inconvenient, time- 
consuming, or even hurtful. Lippard (1988), in particular, points out that lying to 
friends could help maintain loyalty, especially in order to save face. Finally, a 
positive consequence of deception could be getting caught, especially if the 
motive for deception was altruistic. According to O’Hair and Cody (1994):
Those who are exposed for giving other people credit for their own good deeds or 
competent performance not only benefit from an exposure o f their altruistic intent, 
but also profit from getting credit when it is due. Moreover, detection might lead
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to positive long-term consequences involving self-concept and/or relational 
development, (pp. 198-199)
Consequences are a very significant group o f motives because they serve 
as post-interaction reasons that deceivers use to make predictions about the future. 
Furthermore, the type of deception used (e.g., exaggeration, total lie, omission o f  
information) is shaped by the valence and nature of the consequences foreseen. 
Finally, consequences can be valuable motive-oriented tools because the more 
predictable the consequence, the easier it may be for a communicator to decide 
when and/or how to use deception.
Several studies have identified the situational or contextual constraint as a 
construct that influences deceptive communication. The situation may comprise 
o f “(a) access to social cues, (b) immediacy, (c) relational engagement, (d) 
conversational demands, and (e) spontaneity" (Buller & Burgoon, 1996a, p. 214). 
The situation can have a tremendous impact on the decision to deceive. For 
example, three-quarters of the subjects in Hample's (1980) study reported that 
they find themselves in situations in which it is "impossible" to tell the truth. This 
"requirement" to deceive could be better understood if studies attempted to 
comprehend the event-schemata people use when they attend to certain elements 
o f the situation. However, just because the situation may "require" deception, this 
does not necessarily make it "easier" to do so, especially if  one’s communicative 
skills are limited (Buller & Burgoon, 1994, p. 191).
Bell and DePaulo (1996) have focused extensively on situations in which 
potential deceivers find themselves “trapped” in situations that “force” them to lie
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or engage in some type o f deception. One situation in particular is when a liked or 
highly regarded person is asking someone for an evaluation. “These kinds of 
situations can be especially challenging to truth-telling when the person seeking 
the appraisal is personally invested in it” (Bell & DePaulo, 1996, p. 244). Bell and 
DePaulo (1996) tested this notion by having research participants choose 
paintings they liked and disliked and having them discuss their assessment with 
the “artists” (i.e., confederates) whom they were told painted the pieces they liked 
and disliked. Their findings were not very surprising:
[W]hen participants disliked a work o f art that was painted by an artist 
they liked, they were inclined to make no explicit evaluative statements at 
all. In contrast, the same participants (i.e., those who liked the art student) 
were especially eager to state in no uncertain terms their evaluations of the 
paintings they disliked that were painted by other artists. The participants 
who disliked the art student, on the other hand, showed no special lust for 
trashing the work of the other artists. Instead, they evenhandedly offered 
the same proportion of kind and unkind sentiments about the artists’ own 
work and the other artists’ work. (Bell & DePaulo, 1996, pp. 261-262)
A notion driving a deceiver to react in such a way may be that the deceiver cares 
more about the emotional impact of their comments than about adhering to the 
truth (DePaulo & Bell, 1996). As DePaulo and Kashy (1998) put it, “By lying, the 
liars may be saying that they care more about the other person’s feelings than the 
truth” (p. 64).
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Concern for one’s interactional partner or the relationship represents 
another aspect of motives— maintaining relationships. People closely involved 
with each other do-not always want the truth from their partners. DePaulo and 
Kashy (1998) claim:
[PJeople can collaborate to maintain rather than discover each other’s lies. 
Partners in close relationships, more so than those in casual ones, come to 
know each other’s sensitive and taboo topics . . .  By steering clear of such 
treacherous turf, they can reduce their partners’ temptations to lie. (p. 64) 
Collaborative lies (when both people agree to accept one explanation for an event, 
when at least one o f them knows that the explanation is false) in particular can 
become a very functional part o f the relationship (O’Hair & Cody, 1994).
In summary, motives are viewed here as the reasons why people engage in 
deception or choose not to. Motives are an important part o f the deception thought 
process because in deception, as well as in any type of communication, our 
messages have an impact on others and the situation. Also, we consider our 
motives for deceiving because our deceptive acts will affect us as well, with 
regard to those with which we interact and the circumstances that surround us.
Acceptance of deception. This study examines a fourth factor, acceptance 
of deception, which constitutes individuals’ perceptions of how people we know 
or individuals who are important to us view deception. Most scholars agree that 
deception is a prevalent phenomenon and that most people acknowledge their 
willingness to engage in it in various situations (Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; 
Camden et al., 1984; DePaulo & Bell, 1998; Hample, 1980; Hopper & Bell, 1984;
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Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Knapp et al., 1974; O'Hair & Cody, 1994). If a 
communicator believes that deception is by and large accepted by a culture, then 
its prevalence in everyday life may not necessarily be viewed as a bad thing. 
Examination o f this factor or predisposition is warranted because people rely on 
subjective norms to guide their communicative behaviors. Communicators think 
of the opinions about deception held by people who are important to them, and if 
those important others have an overall favorable opinion o f  deception in a 
particular situation, communicators may take that information into account. In 
other words, if deception in a given situation would be okay for other people, then 
it may be seen as permissible for the person who considers it at that time.
As stated earlier, many researchers (Backbier et al., 1997; O’Hair & Cody, 
1994) attest to the acceptance of deception as a norm in everyday interactions. 
This was perhaps the most prevalent during the Scholl and O’Hair (1998) focus 
group discussions. Without hesitation, most participants agreed that deception 
occurs “all the time” and “everyday”, and that society seems to accept deception 
as a common and useful communication tool to help people get what they want. 
More importantly, deception can be useful in getting along with others and being 
polite. Being polite may require communicating in a less-than-truthful manner 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987). In their study examining people’s deceptiveness 
toward those they like, DePaulo & Bell (1996) make an important argument:
No one needs to tell us to be polite when discussing an ugly painting with the 
artist who created it. Disagreements and criticisms are face-threatening and will
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be communicated only very politely, if at all—but even positive communications . 
. .  can be face-threatening (e.g., compliments that cause embarrassment), (p. 704) 
O’Hair & Cody (1994) support this notion by stating, “ [MJost people do not want 
to voice direct interpersonal disagreement, rather they will be deceptively polite in 
order to go along with the flow o f social interaction . .  . The person who is 
brutally honest will be a very lonely person” (p. 192). The point made is that 
deceiving others to save their face is a common communicative strategy and is 
rarely discouraged in some contexts. Because politeness is a widely encouraged 
practice, most people will uphold politeness, even if it means being less than 
truthful. These expectations suggest that in order to get along interpersonally and 
professionally, individuals must forego a certain amount o f honesty in order to 
save face, conununicate appropriately in a variety of situations, or to tailor our 
commimication to accomplish what we set out to do (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; 
O’Hair & Cody, 1994).
One issue regarding the acceptance of deception may be how often people 
engage in this behavior. DePaulo and colleagues (DePaulo & Kashy, 1996, 1998; 
DePaulo et al., 1996) have attempted to determine quantitatively the frequency 
with which people deceive. DePaulo et al. (1996) conducted a diary study with 
college students and community members and found that college students told 
two lies per day, while community members told one each day. In another study, 
DePaulo and Kashy (1998) discovered that participants lied less often to those 
with whom they felt relationally close. Based on these findings, one may argue
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that if deception were not so accepted and welcomed in some interactions, people 
would not engage in it so frequently.
Deception may be viewed not only as a common practice in everyday 
interactions, but also in work-related contexts. The acceptance of deceptive 
communication may be seen in the number of occupations that often require 
deceptive acts in order for individuals to properly perform their occupational 
duties. Police officers (Vrij, 1994), customer service representatives (Elangovan 
& Shapiro, 1998; Ellingson et al., 1999), airline attendants (O’Hair & Cody, 
1994), receptionists (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; O’Hair & Cody, 1994), 
physicians (Robinson et al., 1998), and other professionals must create and 
maintain a certain public image that may be deceptive in order to serve their 
employers’, employees’, customers’, and clients’ best interests. Additionally, 
many government officials have deceived agencies. Congress, and constituencies 
for purposes of serving the public interest or maintaining national security 
(O’Hair & Cody, 1994).
The prevailing acceptance of deception has implications for how 
researchers study this act and how it is measured in communication research. For 
one thing, it is not accurate to assume that deception is always more arousing than 
truth telling. According to Feeley (1996), “A long standing assumption in 
deception research would suggest that, by definition, lying causes significant 
increases in autonomic and physiological arousal” (p. 171), when in fact, 
deception may not be as arousing as once believed (Feeley, 1996). This may be 
because, as implied earlier, deception in interpersonal and other types of
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relationships is not only common but deemed acceptable and necessary (Lippard, 
1988). As Lippard (1988) states, “deception is seen as a “normal” part of 
interpersonal communication rather than as a form of social or moral deviance”
(p. 91 ). Because deception is a common and accepted form of communication, 
this notion may influence people to deceive because they may think that it is 
generally accepted.
While deception may be seen as a common and accepted practice, there is 
still a sentiment that reveals people’s general discomfort with committing 
deception. Indeed, people violate the norm o f honesty more often than they care 
to think (Lippard, 1988). Perhaps our general acceptance of deception as a 
common practice shares a particular relationship with other factors, such as ethics 
or motives. For example, the need to adhere to moral norms of truthfulness is 
often overshadowed by the need to prevent hurt feelings, avoid urmecessary 
physical harm, to maintain important relationships, or to serve others’ interests 
(Burgoon et al., 1996). Determining the prevalence o f the construct acceptance 
may shed light on this issue in future studies.
Intentionalitv. Inherent in many definitions and conceptualizations of 
deception is intentionality, or the level of intent or mindfulness behind a deceptive 
message (Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; Camden et al., 1984; Ekman, 1985; 
Greene et al., 1985; Hample, 1980; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; O'Hair & Cody, 
1994). In Scholl and O’Hair’s (1998) study, a constant comparative method 
revealed that intentionality was a common topic among the Scholl and O’Hair
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(1998) focus group discussions and through the second and third phases of this 
research program; thus, it serves as one o f the five factors examined in this study.
In the context of this study, intentionality implies being mindful of goal 
achievement, communicative skills, and sensitivity to situations and people 
(Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984). Another way to conceptualize intentionality is to 
view it as personal causation (deCharms, 1992). Personal causation in this means 
intentionally doing something to produce a change. deCharms (1992) sees 
personal causation, or intentionality for this study’s purpose, not as a motive or 
personality disposition, but something that every human has; humans experience 
themselves as a cause. Other scholars, such as Ajzen and Fishbein (Ajzen, 1985, 
1988; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen & Madden, 1986), claim that intention is a 
function o f an individual’s attitudes toward a behavior and the subjective norms 
as perceived by the individual. Moreover, individuals weigh these two 
components differently when assessing their behavioral intentions.
Intentionality assumes an amount of strategic message formulation. 
Chisholm and Feehan (1977) in particular set out to explain what it means to 
intend to deceive. In their explanation, they distinguish all deceptive acts as those 
o f commission or omission, positive {adding to a stock of false beliefs) or 
negative {losing the whole or part o f a true belief), and simpliciter (helping the 
target acquire the false belief) or sedundum quid (continuing the target’s 
acceptance o f the false belief). To Chisholm and Feehan (1977), the intent to 
deceive may imply consciously constructing a message based on valence and the
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absence or presence o f information, implying intent to be synonymous with 
strategy and information management.
Many intentional deceptive messages assume a certain amount of planning 
and management of the message being conveyed. Message management can 
include employing specific verbal tactics employed (e.g., past-tense verbs, vague 
statements—) or controlling nonverbal cue leakage (Buller & Burgoon, 1994,
1996; Ekman, 1985; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; O’Hair & Cody, 1994). In fact, 
Lindskold and Walter (1983) assert that deception is only termed as such when 
there is intent:
By definition, lies are intentionally deceptive statements . . .  Untruths told 
by accident, therefore, are not lies nor are falsehoods told by persons who 
are not held responsible for their action or who are not considered able to 
perceive consequences, such as young children or mentally incompetent 
individuals, (p. 129)
In partial support of this statement, a study conducted by Burgoon et al. (1996) 
revealed that deceivers reported modifying their behaviors when telling lies. For 
example, they remembered being more expressive, more attentive, able to manage 
the conversation more smoothly, and being less anxious when telling the truth. 
Burgoon et al. (1996) further report that, “Senders perceived themselves as 
making a better impression during their truthful response . . .  than during their 
deceptive response . .  . and as more believable when being truthful. . .  than when 
being deceptive” (p. 732). Based on studies such as these, it may be argued that
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for a message to be considered deceptive, the deceiver must convey it with 
complete consciousness and intention.
However, it is possible that there are varying levels o f mindfulness or 
intentionality within deceptive communication. Some situations may work to 
heighten or diminish one’s level of awareness that he or she is deceiving another 
person. For example, when an individual must respond to probing questions, the 
need to avoid giving the wrong answer may elicit a  deceptive response (Lippard,
1988). This may occur even before the deceiver is aware that his or her message is 
less than sincere. Another interesting finding emerged in Scholl and O’Hair’s 
(1998) focus group interviews when several participants testified that it is possible 
to be in the middle of deception and not be totally aware or conscious of 
deceiving. Other focus group members (Scholl & O ’Hair, 1998) stated that they 
have been in the middle of uttering a deceptive statement only to realize the 
deception after they made the statement.
Toward a Theoretical Framework of Deception Factors
Having reviewed the five factors that may represent individuals’ thought 
patterns or conceptualizations o f deception communication, this study intends to 
determine how relevant these factors are. Of the factors deemed relevant, it is also 
the intent of this study to determine how internally consistent each factor is in 
capturing its own aspect of people's deception concepts. While there are 
implications this study has for making and testing predictions, or formulating 
causal models, this study sets out to provide a springboard for such investigations 
in the future. Before valid, causal predictions can be made about the influences o f
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deception, one must identify a certain group o f factors that adequately represent 
what it is people think about when they think about deception.
For these factors to make a significant contribution to the area of 
deception, scholarship must examine them from a more theoretical standpoint. 
Recent deception research has called for more theoretical frameworks and models 
that provide an accurate conceptualization o f the deception constructs that may 
eventually be used to predict deceptive behavior. We already know a great deal 
about such deception topics as deception detection (e.g., Buller, Strzyzewski, & 
Hunsaker, 1991; Buller & Aune, 1987; Burgoon, Buller, Grandpre, & Kalbfleisch, 
1998; Cody & O’Hair, 1983; deTurck & Miller, 1990; Feeley & deTurck, 1995; 
Fiedler & Walka, 1993; Levine & McComack, 1992; O’Hair, Cody, & Behnke, 
1985; O ’Hair, Cody, Goss, & Krayer, 1988; Riggio et al., 1987; Zuckerman et al., 
1982), suspicion (Bond & Fahey, 1987; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; 
Levine & McComack, 1991; Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992), behavioral adaptation 
and information management (e.g., Buller, Stiff, & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon, 
Buller, Guerrero, & Afifi, 1996; deTurck & Miller, 1985; Dulaney, 1992; Greene 
et al., 1985; Levine & McComack, 1996), characteristics and traits (Kashy & 
DePaulo, 1996; O’Hair & Cody, 1987), situational constraints on deceptive 
behavior (e.g., DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo et al., 1996; Pawlowski &
Dunbar, 1999; Rowatt et al., 1999), types of deception (Bavelas et al., 1990; 
Hopper & Bell, 1994), and deception on the job (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; 
Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Robinson et al., 1998; Vrij, 1994). While 
knowledge of behavioral correlates and situational constraints may be shed light
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on what we observe about deception, what is missing from this research is a 
viable theory or set o f theories that illuminate the constructs that can be used to 
represent and explain the processes that influence individuals to engage in 
deception. More specifically, scholars need to apply their developed categories of 
situational constraints and typologies of deceptive behaviors and move toward 
uncovering conceptual models that move us closer to being able to predict 
people’s deceptive tendencies across various contexts (DePauio et al., 1996; Stiff, 
1996).
McComack ( 1992; McComack et al., 1992) and Buller and Burgoon 
( 1996) have attempted to answer the call for more theoretical work. In particular, 
McComack (1992) and colleagues (McComack et al., 1992) developed and tested 
the information manipulation theory (IMT), which mirrors Grice’s conversational 
maxims of quality, quantity, manner, and relevance. McComack uses Grice’s 
theory to explain how violations of these four maxims constitute deception. 
However, McComack (1997) later on criticizes his own theory for not being able 
to advance any plausible propositions or predictions regarding these 
conversational maxims and deceptive communication.
Buller and Burgoon (1996) have taken on an extensive program of 
research in developing their interpersonal deception theory (IDT), which 
describes the relationship between the deceiver and the target as mutually 
interdependent, one that involves a multistep process that influences the 
interaction between both deceivers and targets. As outlined earlier, their model 
breaks the deception encounter down into pre-interaction factors (e.g., prior
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knowledge, communication repertoire), interaction factors (e.g., suspicion, 
behavioral leakage), and post-interaction factors (e.g., perceived deception 
success, detected deception). Furthermore, IDT attempts to explain how these 
factors emerge throughout the interaction and cause both interactants to make 
adjustments that enable them to accomplish deceiver- and target-specific goals. 
Critics o f IDT point out the lack o f falsifiability of the theory (DePaulo et al.,
1996), the contradictions among its propositions (Stiff, 1996), and its inability to 
explain the encoding and decoding o f deceptive messages (McComack, 1997). 
While IDT critics do not hesitate to point out its many problems, researchers must 
acknowledge the contributions o f IDT—the attempt to incorporate an extensive 
background o f literature into the current theory, and the continued focus on 
uncovering underlying causal mechanisms of deceptive communication.
Still, what may be missing from the current theoretical work is a more 
cognitive approach to research that may address the discovery of the thoughts 
people have about deception and whether knowledge of these thoughts can give 
us a framework to with which to make predictions about deceptive 
communication. According to Greene ( 1984), cognition is concemed with the 
mental processing of information that “assumes a sequence of structures and 
processes linking inputs to the processing system with the outputs of that system” 
(p. 241). An understanding of these inputs and outputs allows us to describe and 
explain what leads people from such pre-interaction activities as consideration of 
motives, subjective norms, and attitudinal upbringing toward the production of 
deceptive messages. What makes this approach so applicable is that its main
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purpose is to determine imderiying causal mechanisms that are common across 
many phenomena (DePaulo et al., 1996a; Greene, 1984). A cognitive approach 
can tell us many things about how mere thoughts and cognitions lead to 
communicative behavior. The link between thoughts and behavior may include 
how people weigh their behavioral alternatives, attempt to predict the 
consequences, and assess their attitudes toward the deceptive act (Greene, 1984).
The cognitive approach advanced in this study proposes that people do not 
engage in deception merely for its own sake. Rather, communicators rely on 
deception in order to react to situations or to achieve various objectives (Bavelas 
et al., 1990). The reliance on one or more o f the factors existent in one’s construct 
of deception could facilitate the decisions individuals make when encoding 
deceptive messages. An accurate awareness and knowledge of these factors or 
predispositions may make a significant contribution to communication research 
because the uncovering of certain deceptive factors may move scholars toward a 
process model that may inform us of how a deceiver may lead a target away from 
what is perceived to be the truth (Deetz, 1990).
Additionally, these cognitions may be affected, mediated, or preceded by 
the level of intent a deceiver experiences. Another thing we may eventually learn 
from a cognitive approach is how the context or situation in which deceivers find 
themselves can influence the relationship among these constructs, which in turn, 
influences how one responds deceptively to that context or situation. But first, in 
order to move toward the development o f such a predictive theory, the following 
research question is asked:
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RQl: Do the factors of acceptance o f deception, ethics, intentionality, 
motives, and upbringing constitute relevant factors o f deception?
Toward a Conceptual Framework for the Deception Factors
Deception is a communicative strategy much like other forms of 
communication in that it is serves a purpose (O'Hair & Cody, 1994; Goffinan, 
1974). This means that when we use communication to serve our purposes, we 
often choose the words and tactics, more or less consciously, that most 
appropriately serve our purposes. This addresses an issue that is present in 
attitude-behavior relationship, which is, ‘‘the relationship between what people 
think and how they behave” (Prislin & Kovrlija, 1992, p. 1131). The portion o f
that relationship what people think— is the focus for this study.
The development of the theory o f planned behavior (TPB) represents an 
attempt to undercover the relationship between what people think and how they 
behave. The TPB is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA—AJzen 
& Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), “made necessary by the original 
model’s limitations in dealing with behaviors over which people have incomplete 
volitional control” (Doll & Ajzen, 1992, p. 755). TPB and its earlier version,
TRA, were intended to provide explanations and descriptions about the influences 
of information and motivational predispositions on behavior. Both models imply 
that individuals make behavioral decisions based on the consideration of 
information available to them (Conner & Armitage, 1998, p. 1430).
Before the Theory of Planned Behavior, the Theory of Reasoned Action 
was intended to predict behaviors from people’s intentions to actually perform the
41
behaviors and from their control over performing them. Doll and Ajzen (1992) 
explain:
When the behavior, or situation, affords a person complete control over 
behavioral performance, intention alone should be sufficient to predict 
behavior, as specified in the theory of reasoned action. The addition of 
perceived behavioral control should become increasingly important as 
volitional control over the behavior declines, (p. 755)
The TPB in its extended form will be explicated, as well as how its 
components correspond with the deceptive constructs previously mentioned. 
Ajzen and Madden (1986) claim:
According to the theory of planned behavior, among the beliefs that 
ultimately determine intention and action is a set that deals with the 
presence or absence of requisite resources and opportunities. The more 
resources and opportunities individuals think they possess, and the fewer 
obstacles or impediments they anticipate, the greater should be their 
perceived control over the behavior, (p. 457)
Just as with TPB, the deceptive factors examined in this study could represent the 
assessment o f  opportunities and obstacles facing a potential deceiver. If some 
opportunities (e.g., saving the target’s face, believing that deception is right in a 
particular situation) lend themselves to positive outcomes, then deception might 
be the best option. On the other hand, if the opportunity to deceive successfully is 
impeded by too many obstacles (e.g., hurting someone’s feelings, realizing that
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deception goes against what one has learned, feeling that lying would be wrong), 
then the deceiver may decide to stick to the truth.
According to TPB, behavior stems directly from behavioral intention 
(Ajzen, 1985, 1988— see Figure 1), which in turn stems from three components, 
which are attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). The first component, attitude toward 
the behavior, refers to a person’s positive or negative appraisal o f the behavior in 
question (Ajzen, 1985, 1988; Doll & Ajzen, 1992). According to Conner and 
Armitage (1998), “The attitude component is a function o f  a person’s salient 
behavioral beliefs, which represent perceived outcomes or attributes of the 
behavior (p. 1431). Conner and Armitage (1998) conceptualize an attitude as 
beliefs toward the behavior, which may include what people believe is right or 
wrong about deception, or the attitudes toward deception with which one was 
instilled by upbringing. Another way to look at attitude toward the behavior is to 
consider how it corresponds with one’s ethical stance or how one was raised to 
view a particular deceptive situation (i.e., the factors of ethics and upbringing).
The second predictor of intention is subjective norm, which is tlie 
“perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior ” (Doll & 
Ajzen, 1992, p. 755). Subjective norms represent significant others’ preferences 
about the appropriateness of a behavior, and whether or not one should engage in 
it (Conner & Armitage, 1998) According to TPB, subjective norms are also a 
function o f one’s belief system, but those beliefs receive influence from people 
who are important to that individual and from reference groups (Doll & Ajzen,
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1992). This is why subjective norms may be a factor distinctly separate from 
one’s attitudinal beliefs toward a communicative behavior. In addition, subjective 
norms seem to speak to the acceptance of deception factor previously reviewed. 
Just as with the perceived acceptance of deception, subjective norms play a part in 
people’s message choices regarding deceptive communication. What this means is 
that if people important to the deceiver are perceived to view deception a certain 
way, the deceiver may feel motivated to comply with that view.
The third antecedent o f intention is perceived behavioral control (PBC), 
which is the perceived ease or difficulty with which one performs a behavior 
(Ajzen, 1985, 1988; Conner & Armitage, 1998; Doll & Ajzen, 1992). Perceived 
behavioral control reflects past experience as well as anticipated impediments and 
obstacles that influence one’s perceived behavioral control. The stronger the 
perceived behavioral control, the more an individual’s behavioral intention should 
lead to performance of the actual behavior (Doll & Ajzen, 1992). Ajzen’s (1985) 
early presentations of the TPB suggest that “perceived behavioral control and 
intentions would interact in their predictions of behavior such that intentions 
would become stronger predictors o f behavior as PBC increased ” (Conner & 
Armitage, 1998, p. 1431).
The relevance of PBC in this study is that it may correspond with the 
motives people have for deceiving others or for avoiding deception. As stated 
earlier, many individuals may see themselves as thrust into a situation in which 
they feel “forced” to deceive others (Cody & O’Hair, 1994; O’Hair & Scholl,
1998; Scholl, 1999), and that deception in a particular situation may be inevitable.
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or at least a better option than telling the truth. Also, because motives concern 
how one’s communication affects and is affected by others, perceived behavioral 
control may be limited in a given situation due to the fact that others’ actions and 
thoughts are beyond a deceiver’s control. Thus, one may engage in deception in 
order to anticipate a reaction by the target over which the deceiver has no control. 
Such motives may convince a potential deceiver to believe that she or he no 
choice but to deceive the target, which reflects little or no behavioral control over 
the situation.
The fourth component o f TPB is behavioral intent (Ajzen, 1985, 1988), 
which acknowledges the notion o f nonvolitional behaviors, thus extending the 
model from TRA to TPB. According to TRA, intentions represent an individual’s 
motivation to exert effort toward an actual behavior. Intentions and behaviors are 
seen as strongly related, and attitudes toward a specific behavior have an impact 
on behavior via intentions (Conner & Armitage, 1998; Kurland, 1995). However, 
Tn suggesting that behavior is solely under the control o f intention, tlie TRA 
restricts itself to volitional behaviors. Behaviors requiring skills, resources, or 
opportunities not freely available are not considered to be within the domain of 
applicability of the TRA, or are likely to be poorly predicted by the TRA ” 
(Conner & Armitage, 1998, p. 1430; Kurland, 1995). For this reason, Ajzen 
(1985, 1988) added perceived behavioral control, which expands the entire theory 
to include both volitional and nonvolitional behaviors. “This extension of the 
original theory has also been widely applied . . .  and it is apparent that it often
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represents a significant improvement over the predictive capabilities o f the earlier 
model” (Raats et al., 1995, p. 484).
More importantly, the acknowledgement o f volitional and nonvolitional 
control relates to the intentionality factor that has emerged in the Scholl and 
O’Hair (1998) study. As stated earlier, many o f the focus group participants 
talked about unintentional attempts of deception in which they had engaged. TPB 
takes into account that the level of volitional control or intent affects 
communicative behaviors, and that not all behaviors are based on complete 
intentionality. This study contends that not all deceptive acts are motivated by 
complete intent felt by the communicators; rather, some o f them may be the result 
o f a lesser degree o f intent to actually commit deception.
Studies continue to test the viability of TPB in several contexts. For 
example, Parker et al. (1995) tested the theory’s ability to predict driving 
violations, and they found that behavioral intention was predicted reasonably well 
by its three antecedent factors. Other researchers have tested TPB in terms of 
predicting unethical behavior, testing the effectiveness of specific types of 
persuasive campaigns (Giles & Cairns, 1995; Park, Levine, & Sharkey, 1999; 
Schifter & Ajzen, 1985), and even predicting deceptive communication (Beck & 
Ajzen, 1991). Basically what Ajzen (1985) and others (Giles & Cairns, 1995;
Park et al., 1999) have shown in their investigations is that behavioral intention is 
preceded very strongly by what have been determined to be its antecedents—  
attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.
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This review of the theorj' o f planned behavior focuses on issues that 
address the processes influencing one's choice to deceive, particularly the specific 
factors or antecedents to actual behavior. As studies testing TPB suggest, there 
may be distinct identifiable factors that serve as precursors to predictable 
behavior, such as subjective norms, attitudes and beliefs toward behaviors, 
motives, and level of intent. As with TPB, similar factors, such as subjective 
norms that affect our acceptance of deception, ethical codes and upbringing that 
influence our beliefs, motives people have that fit the situation, and intent behind 
a communicative behavior may influence when, how, why, and to whom people 
deceive. What deception scholarship may gain from such a perspective is the 
importance of certain influences that play a role in the shaping of our deceptive 
messages. Such a theoretical perspective may encourage scholars to ask: “What 
factors work to help us decide when to alter the truth?'’ Along with this question 
is the issue of how internally consistent or unidimensional these factors are? 
Applying the theory of plaimed behavior as a theoretical framework provides 
direction in answering this question. The contribution o f  TPB to the current study 
is that it presents a model that identifies certain components o f behavioral 
cognitions. What TPB and the factors in the current study have in common is their 
attempt to identify distinct components or factors that represent a mental model, 
which in turn serves as an entire deception construct that illustrates the influences 
to deceptive behavior.
Some scholars (Seiter, 1997; Thagard, 1989) see the need for greater 
understanding of how individuals’ think about and develop their own mental
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models. For instance, Seiter (1997) conducted a study that explores the mental 
models people construct when they detect deception. More researchers need to 
follow Seller’s (1997) example by looking at other aspects o f deception models. 
An attempt to access individuals’ thoughts and constructs o f deception may allow 
scholars to “explore, more dynamically and holistically individuals’ rich and 
detailed “mental models” (Seiter, 1997, p. 218) regarding deception. Such models 
tliat accurately capture a conceptualization of deception may eventually inform us 
of how communicators decide when it is appropriate to deceive, what kinds of 
people can be duped, or how one morally feels about engaging in deception. More 
importantly, similar to the theory of planned behavior, this study identifies and 
seeks to confirm the factors that represent people’s thoughts about deception. 
Overall, knowledge of how people behave may be linked to the attitudes they 
hold, which helps shape their behavior.
It should be noted that, while TPB is a causal model that has been tested 
repeatedly, the fact that it makes causal predictions is the not the reason why it is 
being applied here. Rather, constructs within TPB and the factors tested here 
share many similarities. TPB addresses attitudes people have toward a behavior 
(i.e., ethics), perceptions o f what important others think about that behavior (i.e., 
upbringing, acceptance o f deception), how one’s behaviors are affected by 
situational or contextual constraints (i.e., motives), and the level of intent behind a 
message (i.e., intention). Besides identifying the core factors underlying deceptive 
behavior, it is a concern o f this study that each of these factors is internally 
consistent and unidimensional. Therefore, the second research question is posed:
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RQ2: Do the factors o f deceptive communication emerging from this 
study represent unidimensional and distinct constructs?
The knowledge of people’s thoughts about deception and the common 
constructs that contribute to the decision-making behind deceptive 
communication can serve as very useful information in such contexts as 
workplace settings or employment interviews. For example, such knowledge may 
inform employers about the deceptive tendencies o f potential employees, and may 
aid in hiring or promotion decisions. In these settings, employees o f  all types and 
levels engage in deceptive and dishonest practices in order to protect their job 
security, their reputation with coworkers and superordinates, and to hide theft or 
losses (Ash, 1971; Bernardin & Cooke, 1993; Cunningham et al., 1994). 
Employers recognize these occurrences and often feel the need to be on guard for 
and prevent these behaviors. Many employers seek knowledge of employees’ 
deceptive and dishonest practices through survey instruments, such as the Reid 
Report (Reid, 1967), the Personnel Selection Inventory (PSI), and the London 
House Personnel Selection Inventory (Terris, 1979; Terris & Jones, 1982), which 
attempt to detect in employees tendencies towards theft and dishonest practices 
that lead to counterproductivity. Such knowledge of people’s tendencies and 
practices may be useful in predicting their future behavior.
It is important that the tests we use to assess people’s attitudes, thus 
helping us make decisions regarding their behavior, should capture what it is they 
attempt to capture. I f  the factors in this study indeed capture the thoughts people 
have about deception, it would make intuitive sense that we would use this
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knowledge for more applied purposes. For example, scholars may wish to use this 
information to design studies that attempt predict individuals’ deceptive 
tendencies based on the deception-related thoughts they may hold. For the current 
study, the factors proposed should represent thoughts that relate to deceptiveness 
or deceit.
Deceit as a construct has been captured by scholars (Christie & Geis,
1970; Hunter, Gerbing, & Boster, 1982; O'Hair & Cody, 1987) interested in 
Machiavellianism. The term Machiavellianism is derived from the writings of 
Machiavelli and deal with such issues as the nature of interpersonal tactics, views 
of human nature, and morality (Wrightsman, 1991). Christie and Geis (1970) did 
extensive work in capturing this construct by designing a scale that taps into a 
person’s strategy for dealing with people, often to the degree o f manipulation. The 
Mach IV (Christie & Geis, 1970) is a scale based on Machiavellianism that 
predicts dishonesty and duplicity within individuals. The Mach IV version o f the 
Machiavellian scale contains 20 items that measure people’s duplicity and 
insincere motives of themselves and other people (Cunningham et al., 1994). The 
Mach IV has been found to be a multi-dimensional construct that includes 
concepts such as deceit, cynicism, and morality (Hunter et al., 1982; O’Hair & 
Cody, 1987; Wrightsman, 1991). Items from the Mach IV that represent deceit 
include, “Honesty is the best policy in all cases” and “There is no excuse for lying 
to someone else”. The Mach IV has been utilized to test the validity of some 
integrity and honesty tests (Cunningham et al. (1994). The construct of deceit is 
of particular importance in this study because of its direct treatment of deceptive
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acts. Also, both O’Hair and Cody (1987) and Hunter et al. (1982) conducted a 
factor analysis of the scale and found identical items to load on the deceit factor. 
The items account for cynicism and morality did not load identically.
The Revised Philosophies o f Human Nature Scale (Wrightsman, 1974) 
assess “philosophies of human nature, conceived of as the expectancies that 
people have about the ways in which other people generally behave” 
(Wrightsman, 1991, p. 385). This 20-item test assesses people’s perceptions of 
such things as trustworthiness, altruism, independence, strength o f will, 
complexity o f human nature, and variability of human nature. Two particular 
concepts relevant to this study are trust and cynicism. Trust deals with the extent 
to which people are conventionally good, while cynicism refers to the perception 
that people do not act in good ways (Wrightsman, 1974, 1991). A factor analysis 
of the original 84 items revealed two factors, those representing trust and 
cynicism, which were found to be correlated to each other to a limited degree. The 
Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale is a 20-item version of the original 
scale and has been recommended by Wrightsman (1974, 1991) as a measure of 
the two central factors.
The rationale of this scale rests in the fact that the way people behave 
communicatively and interact with each other is influenced by their perceptions of 
others’ predispositions, tendencies, and personality characteristics. This applies to 
how, when, and why people engage in deception. As argued earlier, subjective 
norms and perceptions of the acceptance of certain behaviors like deception may 
serve as an important type o f factor mediating current deceptive communication
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choices. For example, someone who highly values honesty and truth may have a 
general trust o f others’ veracity. On the other hand, a person who is cynical o f the 
goodness of others may find it more practical to be dishonest when necessary or 
beneficial to the self.
Knowledge o f deceptive factors or predispositions via such measurements 
and scales may prove to be very valuable information for individuals who may be 
affected or have a lot to lose from others’ deceitful behaviors. If we have accurate 
knowledge of the underlying factors or mechanisms shaping deceptive behavior, 
we may be able to move forward with more studies and make viable predictions 
o f deceptive behavior based on these identifiable constructs.
Therefore, in order to validate the existence o f the deceptive factors as 
well as to test their construct validity, this study poses the following hypotheses: 
HI : There is a significant correlation between the Deceit subscale o f the 
Mach IV and each of the deceptive factors emerging from this study.
H2: There is a significant correlation between the Trust subscale o f the 
Revised Philosophies scale and each o f  the deceptive factors emerging 
from this study.
H3: There is a significant correlation between the Cynicism subscale of 
the Revised Philosophies scale and each of the deceptive factors emerging 
from this study.
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CHAPTER 3 
Methods and Results—Phase I 
The purpose o f this study was to work toward a conceptualization o f 
deception as it is represented by valid, unidimensional factors that influence 
people’s deceptive communication. So far, this program o f research has produced 
a set of data inductively obtained from focus group participants, after which these 
data have been reduced to yield fom possible factors: upbringing, motives, 
acceptance of deception, and intentionality (see Scholl, 1999; Scholl & O’Hair,
1998 for detailed description of this series of studies).
Based on the literature previously reviewed and the nature o f deception as 
a communication topic, it was decided to test these four factors and to add ethics 
as a fifth dimension in the current study.
This study was conducted in two phases. The purpose of the first phase 
was to develop and refine items for a scale that fell under these five factors 
through an exploratory factor analysis. From this phase emerged five clusters of 
items (fairly consistent with those of the first phase) that were incorporated into a 
revised scale for a second phase. In this second phase, each new factor was 
submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis for purposes o f determining the 
internal consistency of each factor (Stevens, 1996).
This chapter outlines the methods implemented and results from Phase I. 
The first phase involved collecting data for purposes of answering RQ1. The 
second phase data were collected to answer RQ2 and HI, H2, and H3 (Phase II 
methods are outlined in Chapter 4).
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Methods
Participants. A total o f 342 individuals participated in Phase I, and each 
respondent in Phase I did not participate in Phase II. Participants consisted o f 
speech communication students from the University of Central Oklahoma, 
communication majors and minors from the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse, 
and individuals residing in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, area. A total o f 215 
females (62.9%) and 124 males (36.3%) participated in Phase I. (Three 
respondents did not indicate their sex.) Ages of participants ranged from 18 to 80, 
with the modal age being 20 (19.9%) (see Table 1 for remaining demographic 
characteristics o f Phase I sample).
Procedures. Recruiting university students involved obtaining permission 
from the instructors and faculty from the universities mentioned above. Before 
these instructors distributed the questionnaires, the author asked them to tell 
students that this was a survey asking about their personal attitudes about 
deception (not about specific acts o f deception in which they had engaged), that 
this survey was entirely voluntary, and that their names would not be connected 
with their responses. Instructors were also given debriefing sheets providing more 
detailed information about the purpose o f the study and how to contact the author 
in the future; these sheets were to be given to students after they completed the 
surx'ey.
When recruiting participants from the University of Central Oklahoma, the 
author asked adjunct and full-time faculty members of the Communications 
Department for their help in distributing the questionnaires. Five adjunct lecturers
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who taught the introductory public speaking class agreed to help by taking 
approximately 50 questionnaires each. They had the option of asking their 
students to complete the questioimaires during a class period or to have students 
take the questionnaires home and bring them back during a subsequent class 
period. Due to varying time constraints o f these adjuncts, the author gave them 
the choice of in-class or take-home participation.
The participants from the University o f  Wisconsin-LaCrosse were 
communication majors and minors, and were the students of a professor in the 
Communication Studies Department who was acquainted with the author. This 
professor took about 100 surveys and offered to distribute them to her students in 
her interpersonal communication class and her introduction to communication 
class. After all of the surveys given to her were completed, the professor mailed 
the surveys back to the author.
Convenience sampling was used to recruit participants from the Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, metropolitan area. These individuals included acquaintances of 
the author and individuals recruited by the author’s acquaintances through 
snowball sampling. That is, individuals approached by the author were asked to 
distribute additional copies o f the questionnaire to people they knew or with 
whom they worked. Questionnaires completed via snowball sampling were 
collected by the acquaintances and returned to the author. These individuals were 
targeted because of their relatively easy access to the author and because the 
author expected that they would diversify the overall sample. This assumption
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was based on such characteristics as age, occupation, socio-economic status, 
educational background, and ethnic and/or cultural identity.
Instruments. The Phase I instrument consisted o f an informed-consent 
form, a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix A), the scale containing items 
representing the five deception factors being tested (see Appendix B), and a 
debriefing sheet containing more detailed information about the purpose of the 
study (see Appendix C). The scale administered in Phase I was a 40-item Likert- 
type scale and included items representing the five factors being tested to answer 
Research Question 1. The scale started with a definition o f deception—“the 
attempt to draw the listener away from what one believes is the truth”—and asked 
respondents to complete the Likert-type scale. This scale consisted of five themes 
emerging from the previous three phases o f  this research program— motives, 
upbringing, intentionality, acceptance o f deception, and ethics. There were eight 
items per theme included in the questionnaire and their order was mixed to 
prevent the detection o f certain themes or trends by respondents (Dillman, 1978). 
Based on guidelines offered by Dillman (1978), items with ordered answer 
choices (e.g., strongly agree—strongly disagree) were used. Respondents 
answered each item by choosing from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each item. This format is ideal for 
determining such things as intensity of feelings, degree o f involvement, and 
frequency of participation (Dillman, 1978). These guidelines are applicable to this 
scale, which is intended to assess people’s attitudes or predispositions toward 
deceptive behaviors.
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Several steps were taken when wording the statements. First, items were 
worded to reflect as much as possible the statements made in the original focus 
group meetings. Several other measures were taken to ensure the integrity and 
quality o f  this scale. Simple, direct, and familiar words were used when 
constructing the statements. Questions were worded to be as specific and clear as 
possible to the respondents. Also, double-barreled, loaded, and leading questions 
were avoided (Dillman, 1978).
Based on McCroskey’s (1970) earlier developments o f the Personal 
Report o f  Communication Apprehension (PRCA-24), the valence or attitudinal 
“direction” was alternated, meaning that half of the items in this scale were 
worded “positively” and the other half were worded “negatively”. More 
specifically, the items reflect either a tendency toward (positive) or a tendency 
away from (negative) deception. Examples o f positive items were, “Sometimes 1 
have to use deception on the spur of the moment” and “Sometimes people use 
deception to benefit the person they are deceiving”. These items convey ideas that 
reflect when deception is preferred or implemented. On the other hand, items such 
as, “My moral stance tells me that deception is never okay” and “Deception is not 
an acceptable form o f communication” are “negative” in tone because they reflect 
a tendency to avoid deception, and thus, were reverse-coded for data analysis 
purposes.
Following the example o f the Mach IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970; 
O’Hair & Cody, 1987), for each group of items, references to “me” and “I” were 
altered with references to “people” in general. This was an attempt to help control
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for social desirability, and it was reasonably assumed that respondents’ reports of 
how other people communicate could accurately reflect how they communicate in 
roughly those same situations. Overall, each item in the scale was worded to 
reflect one o f the five constructs, a positive or negative valence or direction, and a 
reference to either oneself or to other people.
Results
The deception scale was assessed for its reliability using Cronbach’s alpha 
(Agresti & Finlay, 1997). The coefficient alpha of the deception scale was 0.82.
To begin answering the first research question, “Do the factors o f acceptance o f  
deception, ethics, intentionality, motives, and upbringing constitute relevant 
factors of deception?” an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted. Factor 
analysis was deemed appropriate for this phase because this procedure is an 
important part o f the measurement o f psychological constructs, and in this case, is 
concemed with the structure o f a set of variables that may influence deceptive 
communication. While this study has proposed a theoretical framework, this 
particular framework has not previously been applied to this factor structure, and 
therefore, makes this EFA more exploratory in nature (Stevens, 1996). The first 
research question was intended to establish whether or not this factor solution 
exists and to set the stage for the second research question, which tests how 
internally consistent and unidimensional these factors are (Stevens, 1996).
The 40-item deception scale was submitted to an EFA using Varimax 
rotation and principal components extraction (Stevens, 1996). Eigenvalues greater 
than 1.0 and a purity criterion o f .60/.40 were used as primary criteria for
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retaining components. A scree plot was constructed but did not serve as a primary 
criterion for interpretability o f the data. It was also decided that the retained 
factors would contain items loading on no more than one factor.
The resulting analysis yielded 11 components accounting for 62.148 
percent of the total variance. Based on the established criteria, the first five 
components were retained as factors; these accounted for 44.463 percent of the 
total variance. A total of five items loaded onto the first factor (eigenvalue = 
7.748), referred to as “Deception is Wrong” (see Table 2 for factors and item 
loadings). This factor in came from the original “ethics” factor, but was relabeled 
due to the negative valence toward deception expressed by seven of the eight 
items. This factor loaded items fi'om three of the original factors: “motives” 
(“Sometimes 1 have to use deception on the spur of the moment” and “1 would 
rather not use deception even if it’s to benefit the person 1 am deceiving.”), 
“ethics” (“1 have very strong feelings that deception cannot be ethically justified” 
and “My moral stance tells me that deception is never okay.”), and “acceptance of 
deception” (“I do not see deception as an acceptable form of communication.”). 
Before constructing the deception scale for Phase 11 it was decided to drop the 
first “motives” item because it did not fit with the ethical theme reflected by the 
other items. Further justification for dropping the item is in the fact that its factor 
loading (.607) was lower than that of the others items within that factor.
The second factor, “Acceptance of deception”, which had an eigenvalue of 
3.323, had two “motives” items that loaded (“The situation sometimes makes it 
easy for people to deceive someone else” and “Sometimes people use deception if
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it will benefit their relationship with other people.”) and one “acceptance of 
deception” item (“Deception is a common communication practice.”). This factor 
retained its original label because the loading items reflect the view of deception 
as a common and often-accepted form o f communication. This is also in keeping 
with the theme o f the “acceptance” item that loaded.
The third factor, “Upbringing”, loaded two original “upbringing” items 
(“My upbringing often motivates me to use deception” and “The way I was 
brought up often motivates me to use deception.”. This factor had an eigenvalue 
of 2.962.
The fourth factor, “Others’ Opinions”, loaded an “acceptance of 
deception” item (“Most people do not accept deception as an acceptable 
communication practice.”) and an “ethics” item (“Most people feel that deception 
is wrong.”) and had an eigenvalue o f 2.151. This factor was labeled “others’ 
opinions” due to these statements’ references to others’ (rather than the selfs) 
opinions about deception, and it is noted that both items reflect others’ opinions as 
being negative. This factor was also the only new factor emerging from the 
original five.
The fifth factor, “Intentionality”, had an eigenvalue o f 1.602. Two items 
loaded from the original “intentionality” factor (“There are times when I can be in 
the middle of saying something and suddenly realize that I was not telling the 
truth” and “Sometimes I realize that I have deceived someone else only after I had 
done it.”).
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The emergence o f these five factors represents the conclusion o f Phase I 
Before generating an answer to RQl, it was decided to conduct an additional EFA 
once the data from the revised deception were collected. This was done to make 
certain that the subscales submitted to the confirmatory factor analysis (Phase II) 
contained items reflecting the factors they were representing.
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CHAPTER 4 
Methods and Results— Phase II
This chapter outlines the methods for and results of Phase II o f this study. 
Phase II was intended to test the internal consistency and to determine the 
dimensional structure of the newly emerging factors— deception is bad, 
prevalence, upbringing, others’ opinions, and intentionality. What follows are the 
methods and results pertaining to Research Questions 1 and 2 and Hypotheses I. 
2, and 3.
Methods
Participants. The 321 participants from Phase II consisted of 
communication students from the University o f Oklahoma, public speaking 
students from the University o f Central Oklahoma, and residents of the Oklahoma 
City metro area. Students of the University of Oklahoma came from participants 
within the communication department and included students from the basic 
communication course, the public speaking course, and other courses required by 
communication majors and minors. University o f Central Oklahoma students did 
not include those who participated in Phase I, and were recruited by a faculty 
member in the Communications Department. Metropolitan members in Phase II 
did not participate in Phase I, but came from the same population through the 
same convenience and snowball techniques.
O f the 321 respondents, 59.7 percent (n = 186) were female and 41.4 
percent (n = 133) were male. Two individuals (.6%) did not indicate their sex. 
Ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to 59, with 19 being the modal age (N =
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94, 29.3%). Three individuals (1.9%) did not indicate their age. Table 3 has the 
remaining demographic characteristics o f the respondents.
Procedures. Procedures for recruiting University o f Central Oklahoma 
students and members o f the Oklahoma City community were the same as in 
Phase 1. Students from the University o f Oklahoma earned partial course credit 
for their participation. They were recruited with the help of several graduate 
teaching assistants and faculty in the department. Some graduate teaching 
assistants agreed to take a number of surveys and give them to their students to 
either fill out in class or to take home and complete (students taking home surveys 
would bring them back at a subsequent class meeting). Another method for 
recruiting participants was to e-mail instructors and ask them to announce to their 
students that they could sign up on the department’s research bulletin board to 
participate in this project. These students signed up for a time to meet with the 
researcher to complete a survey. Students who signed up came to the author’s 
office, were given the survey materials, and sat at a vacant desk or table in the 
office to complete the survey and were given debriefing information before 
leaving.
Instruments. The Phase II instrument consisted o f the same informed- 
consent form as in Phase 1, a Likert-type deception scale revised from Phase 1 (see 
Appendix D), the Mach IV scale (see Appendix E—Christie & Geis, 1970), and
the Revised Philosophies o f Human Nature Scale (Wrightsman, 1974 see
Appendix F).
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Based on results of Phase I (see Data Analysis below), a scale reflecting 
the retained items, as well as newly added items, was developed and administered 
to a new sample of respondents. This revised scale had eight items per factor. The 
original items that loaded from Phase 1 were incorporated into the second scale, 
and new items were developed to provide an equal number of items for each 
retainable factor. These new items also were written to reflect the same valence 
toward deception whenever possible. Several aspects o f those implemented by 
several researchers who have developed their own attitudinal self-report scales (< 
biblio >) have influenced this scale-revision procedure.
The subscale of “Deception is wrong” contained four of the five items 
loading from the first scale, while four were added: “I only use deception as a last 
resort,” “Deceiving someone is seldom justified,” “1 cannot bring myself to 
deceive others even if it’s socially justified,” and “I try very hard not to use 
deception”. The additional items were worded to express a negative valence 
toward deception.
The “acceptance o f deception” subscale contained all three items loading 
from the original scale and contained five new items: “People use deception for 
all sorts o f reasons”, “I know people who use deception in many circumstances,” 
“Sometimes people feel that they have no choice but to use deception,” “People 
tell me that they have to use deception in difficult situations,” and “Deception is a 
part o f most people’s everyday lives.” The new items were constructed to make 
references to other people’s willingness to engage in deception, as well as their 
views o f deception as a common, everyday occurrence.
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The “upbringing” subscale included the two items emerging from the first 
scale. Six more items were added: “My family has strong feelings about 
deception”, “I was brought up knowing right from wrong when it comes to 
deception”, “I had good role models for understanding the consequences o f 
deception,” “It was continuously stressed when I was growing up that deception 
was unacceptable behavior”, “What I learned in school has influenced what I now 
believe is right or wrong about deception”, and “My family taught me a lot about 
whether deception is right or wrong.” In the wording of the new items, it was 
intended that upbringing might include a variety of influences, such as family, 
school, and peers.
The factor “others’ opinions” contained two items loading from the scale 
and included the following six new items: “Most p>eople act morally when 
tempted with deception,” “Most people I know are honest most o f the time,” “I 
am glad that most people avoid deceptive practices in their lives,” “Most of the 
people I know stress that “honesty is the best policy””, “Most people feel 
uncomfortable about engaging in deception”, and “People I come in contact with 
would hardly ever engage in deception.” Due to the notion o f avoiding deception 
brought up by the original items that loaded, it was intended that the new items 
were in keeping with this theme.
The “intentionality” subscale contained the two items loading from the 
original scale. The following six items were added: “Sometimes I am surprised 
when I am told that I wasn’t exactly honest with someone”, “Sometimes 1 
inadvertently deceive others”, “I have been in situations where I wasn’t as honest
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as I had intended to be”, “In spite o f ray best intentions, I sometimes realized that 
I deceived someone”, “I have caught myself being untruthful without intended to 
be”, and “I have deceived someone else without being aware that I was doing so.” 
Because the original items expressed a lack of intentionality or mindfulness, it 
was decided to construct the remaining items in this fashion.
The items in the revised scale were mixed to decrease the chance that 
respondents could not detect any thematic patterns. Each item also contained a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).
The Mach IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) and the Revised Philosophies 
o f Human Nature Scale (Wrightsman, 1974) were administered to test the 
construct validity of the revised deception scale (Kerlinger, 1986). Construct 
validity, according to Kerlinger (1986), usually seeks to know what properties 
explain the variance of tests, meaning that it is concerned with understanding the 
meaning o f a construct. The items used in a scale to explore a particular construct 
are intended to represent the factors that account for differences in the construct, 
or in this case, deception.
The version of the Mach IV used in this study was a 20-item Likert-type 
scale, with scores ranging from +3 (Agree Strongly) to -3  (Disagree Strongly). 
After administering the scale, the items were then recoded so that +3 becomes 7, 
and —3 is coded as 1. There would be no 4 in this coding scheme (Wrightsman, 
1991). It has been found that the Mach scale correlates very highly with the Trust 
subscale o f the Philosophies o f Human Nature Scale (r = -.70 to -.80—  
Wrightsman, 1991). More specifically, through factor analyses, the Deceit
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construct within this scale has been found to load the same four items consistently 
(—items 6, 7, 9 and 10; see Appendix) (Hunter et al., 1982; O’Hair & Cody,
1987).
The Revised Philosophies o f Human Nature Scale is taken from the 
original Philosophies scale which contains six different components: 
trustworthiness, altruism, independence, strength o f will, complexity of human 
nature, and variability o f human nature. The shortened version, which has the 
constructs of trust and cynicism, has 20 items (10 o f each construct). Each item 
has a Likert-type scale ranging from +3 (Agree Strongly) to -3 (Disagree 
Strongly) with no midpoint score (e.g., 0). As stated earlier, the constructs o f trust 
and cynicism have been found to be negatively correlated (Walker & Mosher, 
1970).
Results
The exploratory factor analysis conducted on the revised deception scale 
was conducted using Varimax rotation and principal components extraction. For 
retaining factors, the criteria used in Phase I were applied to Phase II. Table 4 
contains the item and factor loadings for the revised deception scale. A total of 
four factors were retained, and these four factor constituted 40.379 percent o f the 
total variance.
Research question 1. The first factor, “Intentionality”, loaded six items, all 
o f which were in the “Intentionality” factor at the end of Phase 1. This factor had 
an eigenvalue of 6.736 and accounted for 16.840 percent of the total variance. The 
two items not loading from the revised deception scale were “Sometimes I am
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surprised when I am told that I wasn’t exactly honest with someone” and “I have 
been in situations where I wasn’t as honest as I had intended to be.”
The “Deception is Wrong” factor, which had an eigenvalue of 4.635 and 
11.587 percent o f the total variance accounted for, loaded six items, all of which 
remained consistent from Phase I. The two items not loading from the revised 
deception scale were, “I have very strong feelings that tell me that deception 
cannot be ethically justified” and “I use deception only as a last resort”.
“Acceptance of Deception” was the third strongest factor with four items 
loading. This factor had an eigenvalue o f 2.678 and accounted for 6.695 percent 
o f the total variance. The items that did load were, “Deception is a common 
communication practice”, “People use deception for all sorts o f reasons”, “I know 
people who use deception in many circumstances”, and “Sometimes people feel 
that they have no choice but to use deception”.
Finally, “Upbringing” loaded three items from the revised deception scale. 
This factor had an eigenvalue of 2.103 and accounted for 5.257 percent of the 
total variance. The loading items were, “I was brought up knowing right from 
wrong when it comes to deception”, “I had good role models for understanding 
the consequences o f deception”, and “My family taught me a lot about whether 
deception is right or wrong”.
In addressing the first research question, it has been determined that four 
o f the original factors, “Intentionality” “Deception is wrong” (formerly “ethics”), 
“Acceptance o f deception”, and “Upbringing” represent viable constructs of 
deceptive communication. This response is based on the original items
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constructed for the first EFA, as well as the new items constructed to correspond 
with the factors submitted to the second EFA.
Research question 2. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted 
to answer the second research question, “Do the factors of deceptive 
communication emerging from this study represent unidimensional constructs?” 
The CFA was conducted in two parts. First, a Pearson’s R was conducted for each 
subscale o f items resulting from the second EFA (N = 321; tables 5-8 contain the 
correlation matrices for each of the subscales). The reliability coefficients 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for “intentionality”, “deception is wrong”, “acceptance of 
deception”, and “upbringing” were .886, ,.806, .637, and .777 respectively.
Next, the correlation coefficients were submitted to a confirmatory factor 
analysis. The determination of internal consistency of each subscale was based on 
its reliability (cronbach’s alpha) and a calculation of the standard error for each 
correlation, which is the discrepancy of the predicted and obtained correlations 
(o — p = e). It was determined that items containing standard errors less than .20 
would not be dropped, given an acceptable reliability coefficient.
The “Intentionality” subscale had a reliability coefficient (alpha) o f .886 
and an average correlation of .565. The standard errors corresponding to this 
subscale were relatively low (see Table 9), and for this reason no items were 
dropped. The chi square goodness of fit test, which tests the hypothesis that (a) 
the items are unidimensional and (b) the items are uniform in quality, yielded a 
value o f 118.792 (df = 14, p < .001).
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The “Deception is Wrong” subscale had a reliability coefficient o f .807 
and an average correlation o f .410. The value o f the chi-square is 30.791 (df = 14, 
p < .05). “Acceptance o f deception” had a coefficient alpha of .664 and an 
average correlation o f  .312, and the chi-square value corresponding to this 
subscale was 6.250 (df = 5, p > .05). Finally, the coefficient alpha for the 
“Upbringing” subscale was .779 and its average correlation was .540. The chi- 
square value was 6.332 (df = 2, p < .05).
In order to determine the construct validity of the revised deception scale, 
this study posed Hypotheses 1-3, which predicted that the deception subscales had 
correlations with scales representing the construct of deceit from Mach IV and 
with constructs o f trust and cynicism from the Revised Philosophies scale. The 
decision to use Pearson’s R to determine reliability is based on McCroskey’s 
(1970) decision to use this type of test when assessing the validity o f  the PRCA- 
24.
Hvnothesis 1. The first hypothesis received partial support (see Table 13). 
The Mach IV Deceit subscale (X = 7.162, SD = 1.845) had a significant negative 
correlation with “Deception is wrong” (r = -.445, p < .001) and “Upbringing” (r = 
-.196, p < .001), but was not significantly correlated with “Intentionality” (r = - 
.014, p > .05) and “Acceptance of deception” (r = .060, p > .05).
Hvpothesis 2. The second hypothesis also received partial support. Trust 
(X = 2.770, SD = 9.395) had significant negative correlations with 
“Intentionality” (r = -.115, p < .05) and “Acceptance of deception” (r = -.221, p < 
.001), as well as a significant positive correlation with “Deception is wrong” (r =
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.166, p < .05). Trust was not significantly correlated with “Upbringing"’ (r=  .108, 
p > .05).
Hypothesis 3. A Pearson’s R was also conducted to address the third 
hypothesis. The Cynicism subscale (x = 6.100, SD = 8.372) was significantly and 
positively correlated with “Intentionality” (r = .284, p < .001) and “Acceptance of 
deception” (r = .228, p < .001). Also, there was a significant negative correlation 
with “Deception is wrong” (r = -.255, p < .001). Cynicism did not significantly 
correlate with “Upbringing” (r = -.080, p > .05).
Pearson’s R was conducted to compare the four deception subscales with 
each other. “Intentionality” was significantly and negatively correlated with 
“Deception is wrong” (r = -.131 ,p<  .05) and positively correlated with 
“Acceptance of deception” (r = .324, p < .001). “Intentionality” was not 
significantly correlated with “Upbringing” (r = -.044, p > .05). Also “Deception is 
wrong” had a significant negative correlation with “Acceptance o f deception” (r = 
-. 146, p < .05) and a significant positive correlation with “Upbringing” (r = .410, 
p < .001). Finally, “Acceptance o f deception” was not significantly correlated 
with “Upbringing” (r = .087, p > .05).
Regarding the correlations among the Deceit, Trust, and Cynicism 
subscales. Cynicism was positively and significantly correlated with Deceit (r = 
.123, p < .05) and significantly negatively correlated with Trust (r = -.340, p 
.001). Deceit did not significantly correlate with Trust (r = -.020, p > .05).
<
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CHAPTERS
Discussion
The purpose of this study was two-fold and consisted of two phases. The 
first phase set out to validate the existence of acceptance of deception, ethics, 
motives, intentionality, and upbringing as viable factors representing influences 
on deceptive communication. The second phase o f this study tested the internal 
consistency of the factors emerging from Phase I o f this project. This chapter will 
discuss the findings, limitations of this investigation, and implications for future 
research.
Research Question 1
The first research question, “Do the factors o f  acceptance of deception, 
ethics, intentionality, motives, and upbringing constitute relevant factors of 
deception?” was addressed through two principal components exploratory factor 
analyses. The first run yielded five factors (see Figure 2). O f these five factors, 
“acceptance of deception”, “upbringing” and “intentionality” emerged as 
basically the same factor. The factor representing “ethics” emerged with two o f  its 
original items, but loaded items from other factors, and was relabeled “deception 
is wrong”. Finally, “Motives”, the factor that had the only noticeable discrepancy 
before and after Phase I, had items loading onto two new factors, “deception is 
wrong” and “acceptance of deception”.
First, “Acceptance o f Deception” emerged and loaded an original 
“acceptance of deception” item and two “motives” items, which, when placed in 
the context o f “acceptance” appeared to be consistent with the notion of
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acceptance. Items in the subscale representing acceptance include, “The situation 
sometimes makes is easy for people to deceive someone else” and “Deception is a 
common communication practice.” The words “sometimes makes it easy” and 
“common” suggest the commonplace nature o f deception and its ubiquitous 
presence in everyday life. Furthermore, these statements indicate an acceptance or 
approval o f deception as a common, almost normal part o f everyday conversation 
(Backbier et al., 1997; O’Hair & Cody, 1994), something one may even be 
willing to “put up” with from time to time.
The prevalence or ubiquitous nature of deception works its way into 
people’s conceptualizations of deceptive acts, enabling individuals to consider 
how common or normal that act would be in a given situation (Buller & Burgoon, 
1994, 1996a; Camden et al., 1984; DePaulo & Bell, 1998; Hample, 1980; Hopper 
& Bell, 1984; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Knapp et al., 1974; O'Hair & Cody, 
1994). A focus group participant (Scholl and O’Hair, 1998) testified to the 
prevalence or acceptance of deceptive messages, stating, “[Y]ou can tell like a lot 
of people do that all the time, exaggerate all the time.” In general, acceptance of 
deception may not only mean acknowledging that deception is out there, but 
perhaps coming to accept and even expect deception. For example, another focus 
group participant stated:
“I think that those times with those little white lies that you tell people . . .  
are so common. You know, i f  one of my friends [asks] me, “How do I 
look,” and [I say], “well yeah, you look fine” . . .  that’s no big deal . . .  
everybody does it.”
7 3
The second loading factor, “intentionality”, included such items as, “There 
are times where I can be in the middle of saying something and suddenly realize 
that I was not telling the truth” and “Sometimes I realize that I have deceived 
someone else only after I had done it.” Upon reading these items, it seems that 
these statements reflect some lack of awareness or mindfulness on the part of the 
deceiver. In other words, these statements do not represent a 100-percent level of 
intent during an act of deception. Of course, these findings do not prove that 
people do engage in deception with some lack o f awareness. Rather, the finding 
suggests that the level of intentionality behind a deceptive act may be something 
that individuals consider when making decisions about their deceptive messages. 
People’s conceptualizations of the deception process may include some 
consideration toward the level of unintentionality behind a message.
One sees support for this notion from Scholl and O ’Hair’s (1998) focus 
group findings, in which participants talked about engaging in deception with 
some level o f mindlessness. For example, one individual admitted, “[I]n some 
ways we all try to deceive someone, whether it be intentional or unintentional.” 
When explaining her past deceptive behaviors explained, “You start with little 
things that you didn’t realize . . ,  [y]ou know. . ,  [tjhat you were telling a lie. ”
A lack of some intentionality may be indicative o f  a moderate or low level 
o f strategy implemented in a deceptive message. Based on the work o f Chisholm 
and Feehan (1977), the intent to deceive may imply consciously constructing a 
message based on such factors as valence toward the target or cognitive 
complexity. Perhaps the more intent exists within a deceptive message, the more
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likely it is to be motivated by strategy and information management.
Another issue that warrants consideration is whether a lack of 
intentionality really implies deception at all, but rather a “mistake” in the way 
information was presented. When asked about deceiving others “unintentionally”, 
some of the Scholl and O’Hair (1998) focus group participants admitted that they 
claimed that the event did not involve deception at all. Rather, the “unintentional” 
deceptive message was really the truth later found to be false. Despite this 
possibility, intentionality is a strong factor that consistently emerges within the 
context of deception, as this exploratory factor analysis revealed.
The third factor remaining consistent before and after Phase I was 
“upbringing” and included such items as, “My upbringing often motivates me to 
use deception” and “The way I was brought up motivates me to use deception”. 
The items that loaded suggest two things. First, one’s upbringing has a great deal 
of influence on people’s deceptive behavior. This notion receives support from 
Scholl and O’Hair’s (1998) study, as well as from Buller and Burgoon (1996), 
Cole and Mitchell (1998) and Wood (1993), who claim that one’s upbringing can 
have a tremendous impact on how one views deception. One person from the 
focus group study talked about the influence upbringing has on a child. He knew 
someone whose “parents got a divorce recently. And it turned out [before the 
divorce]. . .  her dad had been going and deceiving people at work . .  . had been 
dating different people”. Although this piece of testimony does not reveal what 
kind o f effect that instance would have, it seems arguable that people call to mind 
the examples o f their parents and other important people, and how these
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individuals’ behaviors influence their own.
The second issue raised by the “upbringing” items that loaded is that 
people may remember is the extent to which their upbringing taught them to use 
deception. One focus group member explained how one leams from example:
“[I]f your parents are deceivers you are more likely to be one.” Items that did not 
load talked about how upbringing motivates people to avoid deception. 
Unfortunately, these findings cannot tell us exactly why that is the case. Perhaps, 
as suggested by Buller and Burgoon ( 1994), the extent to which one has learned 
how to be a competent communicator is related to how often that person engages 
in deception. Competence, in this case, may imply that people may learn to use 
deception more often if they see others succeed with it, or if  it is an easier solution 
than is truth telling.
What remains to be answered is exactly how individuals operationalize 
upbringing. While this study defines upbringing as an individual’s set of habits, 
communicative behaviors, or typical reactions to situations as learned from 
parents, mentors, and other influential persons, the item scores and loadings do 
not indicate who these respondents consider to be important individuals in that 
upbringing process. Influential others within one’s upbringing could be parents, 
teachers, elementary school peers, college friends, or other influential persons.
The next factor, “Deception is Wrong”, originated from the “ethics” 
factor, but received a new label. In general, “ethics ” remains consistent as a 
factor, but it was relabeled here because the items that actually loaded reflect a 
negative attitude toward deception, rather than just an acknowledgement of
76
ethical issues. In essence, one could argue that this factor remains consistent 
before and after Phase I. The relabeling o f this factor to “deception is wrong” is a 
more accurate depiction of the ethics items that eventually loaded.
The ethics-related items that suggest deception is “wrong” include, “I have 
very strong feelings that tell me that deception cannot be justified” and “My 
moral stance tells me that deception is never okay.” The items that loaded may 
speak to the ethics or justification behind deception, implying that deception is 
wrong or unjustifiable and should be avoided. The fact that these particular items 
loaded further suggests that people have a negative attitude toward deception in 
general.
The presence o f a “deception is wrong” factor supports the fact that 
deceivers generally do not feel good about engaging in deception (Deetz, 1990; 
O'Hair & Cody, 1994; Sims, 1992; Smith, 1988), even though they see plausible 
reasons for doing so in specific situations. The Scholl and O’Hair (1998) focus 
group findings yielded many statements to this effect. For example, one person 
said, “[Y]ou can lie and tell [other people] that they look good and stuff but the 
same people you feel very bad telling like a real lie to.” Another person 
commented, “For the most part,. . .  when people think of deception they think o f 
it as being bad.”
Aside from the right or wrong of deception, “deception is wrong” included 
two items that were originally included under “motives”. One o f  the “deception is 
wrong” items states, “I would rather not use deception even if  it’s to benefit the 
person I am deceiving”. This statement not only implies that deception is
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undesirable, but that the seemingly noble reason behind it is not enough to justify 
the act. Whether or not someone feels good about deceiving, he or she 
understands that people have motives for deceiving others (relational, self- 
preservation, other-preservation— Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; DePaulo & 
Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Goffinan, 1974; Hample, 1980; O’Hair & 
Cody, 1994). Based on this interpretation, it is understandable why the factor 
“deception is wrong” loaded some o f the “motives” items.
Before discussing the fifth factor, it should be noted that the “motives” 
item is the only original factor that did not emerge on its own. The blending of 
“motives” items into other factors was partly due to the fact that many of them 
reflected personal moral or ethical viewpoints, which made them more fitting for 
“deception is wrong”. Another reason could be the discrepancy between self­
references (e.g., “I would rather not use deception . . . ”) and other-references (e.g., 
“The situation sometimes makes it easy for people . .  .”). As a result, the self­
references ended up in “deception is wrong” and the other-references loaded onto 
“otliers’ opinions”, which is discussed next.
“Others’ Opinions” is the fifth emerging factor, and it loaded an “ethics” 
item (“Most people feel that deception is wrong.”) and one o f the original 
“acceptance” items (“Most people do not accept deception as an acceptable 
communication practice”). This fifth factor is considered here to be the only 
“new” factor emerging out o f Phase I.
“Others’ opinions”, as does “deception is wrong” implies a negative 
valence toward deception, but unlike “deception is wrong”, “others’ opinions”
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talks about perceptions of other people’s negative opinions of deception, rather 
than one’s own. The fact that this factor emerged on its own could indicate a 
bifurcation o f attitudes within individuals’ conceptualization toward deception.
On the one hand, people could consider their own beliefs, values, motivations, 
and moral standards when deeming a deceptive act wrong. On the other hand, 
they may feel the need to take into account whether others would have the same 
opinion o f that deceptive behavior. It may be interesting to find in future studies 
whether both these ethical issues must be present in the thoughts of deceivers, and 
how they relate to one another, for deception to take place.
It should be noted that an original “acceptance” item (item 4; “Most 
people do not accept deception as an acceptable communication practice.”) Due to 
the negative attitude implied toward deception, and the fact that this statement 
refers to others ’ attitudes, it would make sense that this item is more suited for 
“others’ opinions.
In order to adequately answer the first research question, it was decided to 
conduct an additional exploratory factor analysis to make certain that the 
subscales tested for internal consistency were distinct from each other. As a result 
of the second EFA, four of the five factors emerged: “Intentionality”, “Deception 
is wrong”, “Acceptance of deception”, and “Upbringing”. These factors are listed 
here in order o f strength o f factor loading. In answering RQl, this study contends 
that, as a result of the rigorous data reduction methods used in the first phase, four 
factors represent viable constructs of deceptive communication (see Figure 3).
“Intentionality ” was the first factor extracted and loaded six o f the eight
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items constructed for this factor. It is interesting to note that “Intentionality” 
loaded first in the second EFA, whereas it loaded fifth in the first EFA. Perhaps 
this is because the items constructed for the second EFA became much more 
unidimensional in the subsequent EFA. The chi-square value would provide 
support for this notion. It may be premature to say for certain that deception 
occurs with various levels of mindlessness, but the prevalence and loading of 
these statements may suggest that pure intent is not something necessarily 
required for deception to occur. Furthermore, when people think about deception 
in general, they could be taking into consideration that their deceptive acts may 
have had or will have some level o f mindlessness behind them.
The second factor was “Deception is wrong,” which had six items loading. 
It may make sense that item 31, “I use deception only as a last resort” did not load 
since it does not explicitly express a tendency to avoid deception. Although it still 
reflects a negative attitude toward deception, it still talks about using deception. 
Item 1, “I have very strong feelings that tell me that deception cannot be ethically 
justified,” may not have loaded because it is a rather long sentence that is perhaps 
a little confusing to comprehend upon its first reading, even though it reflects a 
tendency to steer clear o f deception.
“Acceptance of deception,” the third factor, had four items loading. For 
the most part, tlie loading items speak very generally about deception being 
commonplace and frequently used (e.g., “a common communication practice” and 
“in many circumstances”). The items that did not load talked about deception 
being committed “if it will benefit the [the] relationship” (item 7) or the situation
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making it easy for people to engage in deception (item 2). Perhaps when 
individuals think about the acceptability of deception, they do not take into 
careful consideration specific circumstances or situations motivating the 
deception, but the simple fact that deception is common and accepted. The 
“acceptance o f deception” factor submitted to the second EFA contained many 
motive-oriented items, which contain the words “situation” and “circumstance”. 
The implication o f this could be that motives may be more of a heuristic factor or 
thought embedded in the minds of deceptive communicators, rather than a 
prominent cognition that is at the forefront of their minds.
Finally, “upbringing” remains a factor or thought that could be included in 
the thoughts o f deceptive communication. What is most interesting about the 
results o f the second EFA is that the items loading did not say whether or not 
people were taught to avoid deception or to be deceptive. Rather, the loading 
items merely talked about the importance of one’s upbringing, and that people 
learned what was right and wrong about deception. Granted, there were only three 
items reflecting this neutral notion; it could be argued that if more such items 
were included in the scale, they may have loaded as well. This is perhaps because 
people have various backgrounds and upbringings that have shaped their lives. 
Although individuals may have been told a variety of things about deception 
being right or wrong, in general, people acknowledge the importance and 
prevalence o f  one’s background (familial, especially) in the shaping of one’s 
deceptive behavior.
Only one item from “Others’ opinions”—“Most people I know are honest
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most of the time” (item 19) had one item that loaded on a fifth factor, but this 
factor was not retained for the subsequent CFA. The factor “others’ opinions” 
from the first EFA contained items reflecting the perception of a negative attitude 
other people have toward deception, which is shown by such items as 4 (“Most 
people do not accept deception as an acceptable communication practice.”), 9 
(“Most people feel that deception is wrong.”) and 34 (“Most people feel 
uncomfortable engaging in deception.”). Perhaps the only thing linking all these 
items together in the first EFA was that they reflected a negative attitude toward 
deception. Perhaps the reason that only one items loaded onto the fifth component 
(which was not retained as a factor) because this factor was not unidimensional 
enough. The factor as it emerged from the first EFA included items that spoke to 
both acceptability (e.g., item 19) and ethics issues (e.g., item 9) related to 
deception.
Research Question 2
What follows is a discussion o f the results of Phase II, which was intended 
to answer the second research question, “Do the factors of deceptive 
communication emerging from this study represent unidimensional constructs?” 
The factors emerging from Phase II were “Intentionality”, “Deception is Wrong”, 
“Acceptance of Deception”, and “Upbringing”. This portion o f the discussion 
focuses less on the loading o f items to factors and concentrates more on 
addressing the internal consistency and dimensional structure o f each factor.
The first factor emerging in the second EFA, the “intentionality”, 
contained six items that were included in the “intentionality” factor from Phase II.
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This subscale had a relatively strong reliability with the inclusion o f all six items 
(.886). These statements reflect one’s own account of deceptive behavior and/or 
tendencies, as well as perceptions o f mindfulness behind them. Additionally, this 
subscale includes statements recalling mindfulness from the past (e.g., item 35—"1 
have caught myself being untruthful without intending to be” ) as well as 
descriptions o f one’s tendencies to act in the future (e.g., item 5— “There are 
times when I can be in the middle o f saying something and suddenly realize that I 
was not telling the truth.”).
Although “intentionality” loaded first in the second EFA, this factor is 
perhaps the most ambiguous in its meaning or relevance to the study of deception. 
Although “intentionality” emerged as a prevalent and unidimensional construct, 
this still does not tell us exactly what intentional or unintentional means. This 
construct could relate to consciousness or awareness, or be operationalized as 
level of strategy and planning. Also, if a deceptive act is seen as having less than 
100 percent intent behind it, was the act deceptive at all, or was it just a mistake 
or a judgment in error? What we can take away from this analysis is that the level 
of intent behind a deceptive message is a type of thought that people may take 
into consideration, or it may have a mutual influence with other deception-related 
thoughts.
Next, the “Deception is wrong” subscale had six items that reflected 
individuals’ negative attitudes about engaging in deception. Examples o f items 
were, “I do not see deception as an acceptable form of communication (item 11)” 
and “Deceiving someone else is seldom justified (item 21).” These findings are
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consistent with literature that asseits people see deception as an undesirable 
communicative choice. Furthermore, even when individuals decide to deceive, 
they tend not to feel very good about themselves for doing it (Hample, 1980). 
Another example o f this sentiment can be found in the original focus group data 
in which one person said, “I feel like it is wrong when I do it at first, then a couple 
o f days later I feel really bad” (Scholl & O ’Hair, 1998).
One might view this subscale as one that represents personal ethics; the six 
remaining items refer to a moral stance that does not permit deception, or reflects 
a sense of discomfort with the idea of engaging in deception. Moreover, all these 
items refer to the self (e.g., F’, “my”), reflecting a negative feeling about 
envisioning oneself deceiving others. These items have their origin in some o f the 
focus group data that refer to this notion. For example, one individual said, “If 
you lie so much and deceive so much . . .  your conscience actually gets to ya.” It 
could be argued that one type o f thought encompassed in one’s deception 
construct is the extent to which one feels unjustified or uncomfortable with 
committing deception.
The “acceptance of deception ” factor included such items as, “Deception 
is a common communication practice (item 12)”, and “People use deception for 
all sorts of reasons (item 17).” The “acceptance” factor reflects the perceived 
prevalence and acceptance o f deception in other peoples’ everyday interactions, 
an idea that has been supported by the reviewed literature (Backbier et al., 1997; 
Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996a; O’Hair & Cody, 1994). These items are also 
quite similar to the statements emerging in Scholl and O’Hair’s (1998) focus
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group interviews. Interviewees said such things as “People lie all the time” and 
that deception occurs “a whole lot”. According to another focus group participant; 
1 think we demand it. 1 can’t imagine someone going around not deceiving 
. . .  telling people what [they really] thought. . .  or saying, “you look like 
crap this morning.” That would be bad! 1 mean, you would be considered 
an outcast if you weren’t deceptive.
It could be argued, then, that when individuals think about committing 
deception, or the idea of deception itself, they take into account their perception 
that other people do it quite often, that people consider deception an often 
necessary way to communicate, and perhaps that people are often lying to them. 
Whether it is a perception of people’s motivations, or their mere acceptance of 
deception as a communication strategy, overall, “acceptance of deception” as a 
unidimensional construct seems to be conveyed here as the thought representing 
the extent to which people perceive deception to be a common and everyday 
occurrence.
It should be pointed out that the reliability coefficient for the “acceptance” 
subscale was .644, perhaps a little too low. The chi-square value was lower in 
comparison to the other subscale (.6.250), which suggests that the goodness o f fit 
hypothesis is unsupported (p > .05). Perhaps there could have been more 
statements in the revised deception scale that reflected a more general acceptance 
o f  deception, rather than items that refer to specific motives (e.g., benefiting the 
relationship, avoiding difficult situations). It is possible that the “acceptance” 
subscale submitted to the second EFA was not very unidimensional.
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The “upbringing” factor, which emerged in both Phase I and II, only had 
three items loading in the second EFA. These items were submitted to the CFA 
and yielded an alpha coefficient o f .779. As stated earlier, these three items reflect 
an appreciation o f the importance o f one’s upbringing in shaping one’s deception- 
related attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The items not loading (and thus not 
included in the CFA) were not neutral with regard to what one is actually taught 
about deception. Items such as “My upbringing often motivates me to use 
deception (item 3)”, “The way I was brought up often motivates me to use 
deception (item 8)”, and “It was continually stressed when I was growing up that 
deception was an unacceptable behavior (item 28)”. These items reflect both 
positive and negative valences, and therefore, could have imdermined the 
dimensional nature o f the “upbringing” construct prior to the second EFA.
Perhaps if there were more neutral “upbringing” statements, there would have 
been more items included in the subscale submitted to the CFA.
This prevalence of an “upbringing” factor is consistent with the literature 
that points to parents and close family members as important influences on one’s 
deceptiveness (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Scholl & O’Hair, 1998; Wood, 1993). 
Scholl and O ’Hair (1998) also found their respondents spoke of the importance of 
their childhood upbringing. Many focus group participants agreed that what their 
parents taught them about lying and deceiving remains salient in their minds to 
this day.
What should not be disregarded are the thoughts people may still have in 
mind about what they were specifically taught about deception. For example.
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despite the overt message people may get about deception being unacceptable, 
there is evidence to the contrary. For example, one focus group member said: 
[L]ittle kids are pretty truthful all the time and they learn to not be so 
naïve and not to be so truthful because they get hurt telling the truth. You 
know like if you say, “Mom, look at the fat lady” . . .  your [mom’s] going 
to think, “oh, yeah, she’s fat” . . .  [but you’re] going to get punished for it, 
so you learn not to tell the truth in all situations.
This statement may remind us that individuals not only appreciate the importance 
o f their upbringing, but also that individuals remember specifically what they 
were taught. For instance, some children may get an overt, explicit message from 
their family or parents telling them to avoid deception and to be truthful to others. 
However, what the factor o f “upbringing” does not take into account are the 
subtle messages that may be transmitted from parents to children, inadvertently 
telling them that there are some situations where it may be better to avoid the 
truth. This is an important issue that should be taken into account as the factor of 
“upbringing” is explored in future research.
In addressing the second research question, this study contends that the 
factors of “Intentionality”, “Deception is wrong”, and “Upbringing” represent 
unidimensional and internally consistent factors of deceptive communication. 
This response is based on the reliability coefficients and the chi-square values. 
For this reason, “Acceptance o f deception” has not yet been found to be an 
internally consistent and unidimensional factor.
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What this study’s findings suggest thus far is that, first, “intentionality 
reflects the perception of one’s level of mindfulness or intent behind their 
deceptive messages. Second, they view deception for themselves as unethical or 
unjustified (i.e., “deception is wrong”). Third, “upbringing” represents the level of 
importance of one’s upbringing in shaping one’s attitudes toward deception, as 
well as one’s deceptive tendencies. Fourth, although not statistically supported 
here, there may be thoughts representing the extent to which individuals see 
deception as a ubiquitous and acceptable part of life.
It should be noted that these factors are not viewed here as reported 
behaviors or intent to behave deceptively. Rather, these factors are viewed as the 
cognitions that may adequately represent what people think about when they think 
about deception. In other words, what this entire program of research could be 
uncovering are the constructs through which individuals most likely progress as 
they consider formulating and executive a deceptive message. For example, for 
individuals to consider deceiving others, they may likely consider such things as: 
a) how uncomfortable they are with committing the act themselves, b) how 
acceptable or normal deception is in general, c) what they have been taught by 
their families about deception and how important that upbringing is to them, and 
d) the level of intent they feel behind the message.
Future directions for exploring these thoughts or factors are discussed 
below. In addition, the relationships among these factors warrant consideration 
and they are discussed next.
Hvnotheses 1-3
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Three hypotheses were posed to test the construct validity of the four 
factors emerging from the second EFA by comparing them to commonly tested 
items intended to predict deceit, as it is measured by the Mach IV (Christie & 
Geis, 1970). The construct validity of the four factors was also tested in terms of 
their relationship with the constructs of cynicism and trust, which are perceptions 
o f other people’s tendencies as measured by the Revised Philosophies of Human 
Nature Scale (Wrightsman, 1974).
Hvpothesis 1. There were many significant correlations between the four 
deception factors and the Mach IV Deceit subscale. The Deceit subscale indicates 
the degree to which one exhibits deceptive tendencies. The higher the score, the 
more deceptive one tends to be (Christie & Geis, 1970; Wrightsman, 1991). The 
strongest correlation among this comparison was between Deceit and "deception 
is wrong”. This was a significant negative correlation, meaning that the higher the 
measurement of Deceit, the less likely that respondents would agree that 
"deception is wrong”. On the other hand, the more someone believes that 
"deception is wrong”, the less likely they would be to deceive. This would make 
sense given that if people have a high tendency to be deceptive, the less remorse 
or regret that person would have with engaging in the act. In other words, a very 
deceptive person may be able to justify ethically a deceptive act in order to feel 
comfortable doing it.
The Deceit subscale had another significant negative correlation with 
"upbringing”. What this correlation suggests is that the stronger someone’s 
upbringing, the less deceitful that person may be. This correlation may hint at the
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nature of the “upbringing” factor in that it may really reflect the extent to which 
one is taught that deception is wrong or undesirable. The more salient this 
particular notion is, the less likely one will display deceptive tendencies.
There were no significant correlations between Deceit and the factors of 
“acceptance of deception” and “intentionality”. It is interesting that, while 
nonsignificant, the correlation coefficient between Deceit and “acceptance” is 
positive. It is interesting that “acceptance” did not significantly correlate with 
Deceit, given that it may be the case that the more deceptive one is, the more 
likely one is to see deception as a prevalent and common communication practice. 
Perhaps “acceptance” and Deceit would share a significant relationship with each 
other if they were correlated with at least one of the other factors (as in a multiple 
regression) that would serve as a moderator.
Regarding the nonsignificant correlation with “intentionality”, the 
correlation coefficient, although nonsignificant, was negative. As is the case with 
“acceptance”, one or more moderating variables may need to be considered.
Hvpothesis 2. The four deception factors were also compared with the 
Trust and Cynicism subscales o f the Revised Philosophies scale to account for the 
perceptions people have about the tendencies of others. As defined earlier, trust is 
the degree to which people see others’ actions and behaviors and good and sincere 
(Wrightsman, 1974, 1991). Trust had a significant positive correlation with 
“deception is wrong”. Trust as a subscale has to do with a person’s perceptions of 
the goodness, sincerity, or honesty of others. Based on these findings, it would not 
be surprising that a high Trust score would relate to a high “deception is wrong”
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score. It could be that someone who feels ethically uncomfortable with deceiving 
others may think (or at least hope) that others would share that viewpoint.
Trust correlated negatively and significantly with “acceptance of 
deception” and “intentionality”. Regarding “acceptance”, the findings suggest that 
the more trust individuals place in others’ veracity and good nature, the less likely 
they are to see deception as a common part of everyday life. What is also 
noteworthy is the negative correlation between trust and “intentionality”. High 
scores on intentionality would mean the greater likelihood individuals believe 
themselves to be capable of engaging in deception and not being totally aware o f 
doing so. If one believes that people are engaging in deception, but often not 
realizing it, then it would make sense that a person may not feel confident in 
trusting others to tell the truth, perhaps more often than they would realize or 
admit.
Trust did not have a significant correlation with “upbringing”, although 
the correlation coefficient was positive. Perhaps with a  larger sample size, this 
correlation would have been significant.
Hypothesis 3. Cynicism was the other Revised Philosophies subscale 
compared with the four deception factors. According to Wrightsman ( 1974,
1991), cynicism is the distrust of others’ actions or behaviors, or the extent to 
which one perceives others’ actions to be ill-intended or insincere. This 
comparison yielded one significant negative correlation and two significant 
positive correlations. First, cynicism was negatively correlated with “deception is 
wrong”. The higher the cynicism score, the lower the “deception is wrong” score.
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suggesting that individuals who tend to be distrustful of other people’s intentions 
may feel more comfortable with engaging in deception. This may make intuitive 
sense in that if one expects others to be deceptive, then that person may view 
deception permissible for oneself. Another possibility is that the more one 
distrusts others’ motives, the more one may need to engage in self-protection, and 
deception may be a viable way to protect oneself. O’Hair and Cody (1994) 
support this notion, asserting that deception is sometimes viewed as a survival 
strategy.
A different type o f interpretation of this correlation would be that 
communicators who are more comfortable with engaging in deception would 
more likely expect others to be just as comfortable, if  not more. The reason here is 
that people may feel the need to protect their self-interests, and perhaps being 
honest or truthful in some situations makes one feel vulnerable to others’ 
dishonorable intentions.
Cynicism positively correlated with “acceptance o f deception” and 
“intentionality”. First, with “acceptance”, it would make sense that if one views 
deception as a prevalent and often-accepted phenomenon, then one would 
understand the need to be cynical of others who would view deception in a similar 
fashion.
The other positive correlation that is more difficult to interpret is the one 
between Cynicism and “intentionality”. With “intentionality” the higher the score, 
the more individuals could account for deceptive attempts that were lacking intent 
or mindfulness. What this suggests is that if people believe in the possibility o f
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engaging in deception without realizing it, then they would expect other people to 
be capable o f doing the same thing, probably more than they realize.
There was no significant correlation found between Cynicism and 
“upbringing”. This could simply mean that the salience or importance o f one’s 
upbringing by itself may not be directly related to the cynicism toward others’ 
attitudes or actions. For “upbringing” and cynicism to be correlated, there may 
need to be an additional factor or variable linking the two.
Another group o f correlations to consider is that among the four deception 
factors. “Deception is wrong” negatively correlated with “acceptance”, which 
suggests that the more people feel uncomfortable engaging in deception, the less 
likely they would accept deception as a prevalent and common activity. Also, 
“deception is wrong” was positively correlated with “upbringing” (This was the 
strongest correlation; r = .410), which is not surprising, given the nature o f the 
items in the “upbringing” subscale.
“Intentionality” had a positive correlation with “acceptance o f  deception ”, 
which may indicate that the acceptance of deception as a common activity is 
related to the tendency to deceive others sometimes without intending to. This 
may imply that a person who tends to engage in deception inadvertently or 
without 100 percent conscious thought may have a greater tolerance for deception 
in others. “Intentionality” also had a negative correlation with “deception is 
wrong”, meaning that the greater the likelihood that one would engage in 
deception inadvertently, the more comfortable one is with deception (lower score 
on “deception is wrong”).
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Finally, “upbringing” did not significantly correlate with “acceptance o f 
deception” or with “intentionality”. The nonsignificant finding with “acceptance” 
could be due to the neutral way the items were worded, meaning that 
“upbringing”, as stated earlier, only consists of items reflecting the importance o f 
deception. These items do not say whether someone was taught to engage in or 
avoid deception; furthermore, these items do not reflect a like or dislike toward 
deception. On the other hand, the “acceptance” items undoubtedly were 
directional in nature, reflecting tendencies toward deception.
That “intentionality” and “upbringing” were not correlated could be due to 
the possibility that these two subscales do not measure deceptiveness in the same 
way. On the one hand, “intentionality” refers to one’s belief in engaging in a 
deceptive behavior without full intent. In contrast, “upbringing” does not refer 
directly to deceptive behavior, but to what one is taught by others about 
deception. Furthermore, “upbringing” may include memories of how others 
(rather than oneself) were deceptive or truthful. Perhaps the reason these two 
factors were not significantly correlated is because they were measuring thoughts 
of deception, but in two very different ways (memories of others’ deception- 
related beliefs vs. one’s own ability to behave deceptively). If the sample size 
were larger, however, and if there were another factor included in the correlation 
(i.e., multiple regression), perhaps these two factors could have been found to be 
significantly correlated.
In summary. Hypotheses 1 -3 inquire about the construct validity o f the 
four emerging factors in this study. There were significant correlations that
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indicate many of the deception-related variables were indeed related (e.g.. Trust 
with “deception is wrong”. Cynicism with “acceptance of deception”). Also, 
many variables that appear, at face value, to be opposite in terms o f deception 
were negatively correlated (e.g.. Deceit with “deception is wrong”. Trust with 
“acceptance o f deception”). However, some deception-related items did not 
significantly correlate (e.g.. Deception with “acceptance of deception”. Trust with 
“upbringing”). The inability of all variables to correlate with one another could 
indicate a lack of construct validity. However, due to a few of the limitations 
mentioned below, it would be premature to argue that these factors lack validity 
without including these factors in future studies by correcting for the limitations 
o f the current study.
Limitations
Before addressing the theoretical and practical implications o f these 
findings, as well as laying out the future for this program of research, several 
limitations of this study need to be addressed. First, a limitation o f the study may 
be seen in the way the data were collected, which was through convenience and 
snowball sampling. Attempts were made to make the sample as heterogeneous as 
possible by accessing people within and without the university student population. 
However, convenience and snowball sampling techniques do lend themselves to 
biases. Such biases include a positive bias toward the researcher, and completing 
the survey in the presence of distractions o f which the researcher is unaware.
Also, as the demographics of the sample reveal, a large majority o f the 
respondents were undergraduate, college-age students who likely made the overall
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sample relatively young. However, given the exploratory nature of the study, the 
author was willing to accept less-than-random methods for collecting the data.
The sampling methods used in this study allowed for relatively quick and easy 
data collection. The methods o f data collection also seem less than severely 
detrimental given that this study was more interested in gathering information and 
validating that information, rather than carrying out experimental procedures, 
making predictions, or generalizing the findings to a larger population.
Another limitation was the lack o f more systematic pre-testing of the 
scales used. Although the author made periodic checks o f reliabilities as the data 
were accumulating during both phases, this does not substitute for pre-testing the 
scales before data are collected. Despite this limitation, wording of particular 
items as well as decisions to include or exclude certain items during a particular 
phase o f  this research program were largely a result o f the outcome of the phase 
preceding it. In other words, each phase of this research program produced data 
that had been tested and validated for use in the subsequent phase. Furthermore, 
this program o f research has its origins in emically derived data, which provides 
researchers with a rich set o f information that otherwise could not be obtained 
through empirical approaches by themselves.
The sample size is another issue that needs consideration. Phase 1 had 339 
respondents and Phase II had 321. Scholars such as Stevens (1996) would claim 
that a factor analysis requires 20 respondents per item in a scale, which would 
make both Phases limited in sample size. Granted, the replicablity of the factors 
depends a great deal on the number o f respondents, meaning the more the better.
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However, Gorsuch (1983) claims that there is no agreement on the proper ratio 
between number of respondents to variables. Gorsuch (1983) goes on to 
recommend no less than 5 respondents per item, and this study did exceed that 
minimum. Due to the resulting high reliabilities o f each subscale, it is this 
author’s contention that this study did not suffer greatly from the effects of its 
sample size.
Another issue that needs attention is the low reliability (.450) of the Mach 
IV Deceit subscale. Although this reliability would be considered poor compared 
to the other subscale reliabilities, the Deceit subscale has been used and tested 
extensively in other studies (Hunter et al., 1982; O ’Hair & Cody, 1987; 
Wrightsman, 1991). This subscale also has been used in a similar fashion by 
O’Hair and Cody (1987) and by Hunter et al. (1982), and both studies generated 
identical factor structures with regard to the Deceit subscale.
An additional limitation could be found in the use factor analysis itself. 
There are many things exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are capable 
of, such as reducing data into usable, interpretable factors, summarizing 
interrelationships among variables to aid in conceptualization, and serving a 
heuristic function in building and/or contributing to communication theory. On 
the other hand, factor analysis is limited in that it cannot by itself make causal 
predictions based on how individuals respond to scale items. It should be noted, 
however, that this study in particular was not intended to make predictions or to 
arrive at generalizations about deceptive communication. This study had a 
primary goal of arriving at and validating viable factors that could be used in
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future studies that are more variable-analytic and predictive in nature, or at least 
point out relationships that exist for reasons other than those that hypothesize 
causality.
Implications for Future Research
Having discussed the results and limitations o f this study, we come to the 
implications of the findings, not only for the next stage of this research program, 
but also for their theoretical and practical applications. This study has revealed a  
great deal about people’s deception-related thoughts and added to what we 
already understand about deceptive communication. The results of this study 
suggest that individuals may have particular types o f thoughts with regard to 
deception. The decision to engage in deception may depend on how comfortable 
or justified a person is in deceiving (i.e., the extent to which “deception is 
wrong”), how “normal” or common the deception may be in comparison to other 
acts (i.e. how “acceptable” or prevalent is the act), and how much the act would 
conflict with what that person has been taught (i.e., “upbringing). Additionally, 
the level of intentionality behind that message may have an impact on how 
deceptive that message appears from the deceiver’s perspective, as well as 
whether it is implemented in the first place.
Given what this study has revealed, the next logical step would be to test 
these factors in order to determine the nature of their relationship with one 
another. It may be insightful by itself to have the knowledge that these factors 
indeed exist, but it would be more informative to know how they relate to one 
another. Seeing the type, strength, and direction(s) o f the interrelationships among
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the factors can help us understand how this thought structure serves to influence 
one’s willingness to engage in deception, or how a deceptive message would be 
implemented. For example, are there certain situations in which some factors 
become more prevalent or accessible than others are? Also, are there situations in 
which one factor (e.g., others’ opinions) outweighs another factor (e.g., 
acceptance o f  deception) when a person is considering a deceptive message? 
Additionally, under what conditions must a person consider one’s own ethical 
stance (that deception is "wrong”) before proceeding to one’s perception of 
others’ opinions regarding that deceptive act, or vice versa?
Given these questions, it may be worthwhile in the next phase o f this 
program to conduct a path analysis or to develop a path model. This approach 
could indicate not only which factors most strongly correlate with one another, 
but if there are any directional correlations that tell us of progressions from one 
factor to another. In other words, is there a factor or group o f factors that have a 
causal or correlational link with another factor or group of factors? This 
perspective is similar to the approach taken by Hunter et al. (1982), who factor 
analyzed the constructs contained with the Mach IV scale. The authors submitted 
the results o f their second-order factor analysis to a path model, and the resulting 
model showed that some constructs of the Machiavellian concept are antecedents 
o f other constructs (see Hunter et al., 1982 for a detailed discussion of the 
development o f the path model).
It is through the use of a path analysis or path model that provides for 
further application of the Theory of Planned Behavior. As seen in Figure 1,
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attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control 
have been found to be antecedents to behavioral intent, which precedes actual 
behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1988). The TPB appears to incorporate many o f the same 
types of factors similar to those in the current study. For example, subjective 
norms are to “acceptance” as attitudes toward the behavior is to “deception is 
wrong”, and so on. TPB also contains an intentionality component, termed 
behavioral intent in its model. It would be interesting to see if a path model 
conducted in the next phase of research would be similar to the model that has 
been proposed for TPB. So far, the emerging factors may imply some similarities 
between the current factor structure and the constructs contained within the 
Theory of Plaimed Behavior.
To explore this idea further, TPB portrays behaviors as being influenced 
by behavioral intent, which is preceded and influenced by attitudes toward the 
behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. First, TPB and the 
current factor structure both contain elements o f intentionality, or the level o f 
mindfulness behind a communicative act. TPB posits that behaviors are not 
always preceded by volition, but often by nonvolitional influences (Ajzen, 1985, 
1988; Doll & Ajzen, 1992). Perhaps deceivers vary in their mindfulness or 
mindlessness when constructing and executing deceptive messages.
Another connection between TPB and the current factors exists through 
the emergence o f “acceptance of deception” as they pertain to subjective norms. 
TPB argues that subjective norms, or others’ perceptions of a given behavior, is 
an important antecedent to behavioral intent as well as to the actual behavior itself
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(Ajzen, 1985, 1988). “Acceptance” could be related to subjective norms because 
of their link to what other people think about or do. The “acceptance” items may 
imply that if  deception is a common activity, then others, in addition to the person 
considering deception, are perceived as engaging in the act as well. What this 
means is that, when a deceiver must decide when, why, and how to execute a 
deceptive message, he or she needs to assess the opinion others have toward a 
behavior, as well as how much the act is an accepted part of everyday 
communication.
Finally, TPB and the current factor structure have in common the notion 
of attitudes toward the behavior, which may be related to the factors of “deception 
is wrong” and “upbringing”. These themes refer to individuals’ negative feelings 
and attitudes about deception, or how uncomfortable they feel about engaging in 
the act. In addition, the opinions individuals hold about deception are largely 
shaped by what they have been taught during their upbringing, and these 
teachings are often laced with value-laden judgments about deception being right 
or wrong. For these reasons, TPB’s attitude toward the behavior may be related to 
the extent to which people think deception is bad, as well as what people are 
taught about the morality o f deception by their families or parents.
It is not the intent for this portion o f the discussion to be conclusive or to 
say that the emerging factors are identical to those contained within TPB; that is 
for future studies to determine. Rather, the application of TPB thus far provides a 
springboard from which future phases of this research program can progress.
Once these studies are executed, it would then be more reasonable to draw more
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solid conclusions about how one may interpret the results, as well as suggesting 
what implications these results have for the Theory of Planned Behavior.
Aside from the next phase o f  this research program, this study still leaves 
many questions to be asked. First, how common or generalizable are these 
thought patterns across individuals or situations? Are these five factors specific to 
a particular age group or culture, or can these five factors be found to cross most 
demographic and cultural boundaries? It is true that both phases of this study 
predominantly consisted of respondents who were Euro-American or white, and 
were between the ages of 18 and 25. A good test o f a group of constructs that 
have theoretical potential would be to determine their applicability across various 
cultural and demographic groups.
Another group of questions relates to the strength or saliency of these 
factors. For example, does the strength o f one or all of these factors correlate with 
actual deceptiveness? If so, which factors have a positive relationship with 
deceptiveness and which relate to deceptiveness inversely? We may be able to 
make some predictions based on the correlations that were conducted to check for 
construct validity (Hs 1-3), but the factor analyses in this study do not say much, 
if at all, about the likelihood of deception based on scores o f the subscales; they 
merely speak to strength of a factor. Future studies would have to conduct 
inquiries involving manipulated and observed variables in order to answer these 
questions.
In terms o f the deception literature, this study’s findings have implications 
for altering how deception is defined, conceptualized, and operationalized with
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regard to intention. Most of the literature that attempts to define deception 
assumes that for a deceptive message to be identified as such, it must contain 
intent, meaning that a deceiver must be totally mindful o f  doing the deceiving. 
While this study (or this research program, for that matter) has not provided solid 
proof to the contrary, it does yield results that suggest that deception may not 
always contain as much intent as the deception literature would claim. The factor 
o f “intentionality” as it emerged in its Gnal state contains items that suggest an 
element of unintentionality behind deceptive messages. Future phases of this 
research program will further pursue this issue. It is also the hope that other 
scholars will consider the level of intent more seriously.
While this study may serve as a springboard for answering some of the 
aforementioned questions, it also has many theoretical implications. First of all, 
this program o f research is on its way to answering the call for more theoretical 
work in deception, as put forth by such scholars as McComack (1997) and Buller 
and Burgoon (1994, 1996a). The need for more theory building in deception is 
derived from the need to provide the body o f deceptive literature with more 
explanatory and predictive findings. This approach hopefully will move the area 
o f deception above and beyond documenting behavioral correlates of deception 
toward predicting the conditions under which people will be deceptive, or 
predicting the types o f adaptive behaviors deceivers and targets will engage in (as 
Interpersonal Deception Theory attempts to do). It is the hope o f this research 
program to do just that. By identifying the thoughts or factors that serve as 
predispositions or influences of deceptive communication, this program could
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make a contribution to the need for more predictive theories that explain what 
actually happens when people engage in deception. For example, whether or not 
someone engages in deception, or what kind o f deceptive strategy a person 
engages in, may be influenced by certain factors or deception-related thoughts. 
Furthermore, the factors influencing deceptive behavior may themselves be 
influenced by the situation or a certain set o f conditions (nature of the 
relationship, knowledge o f the target, etc.). Thus, knowledge o f the situation and 
its effect on the types o f thoughts a deceiver has may help one predict whether or 
not one engages in deception, or what deceptive strategies a deceiver may use. 
What this example illustrates is that knowledge of how situational constraints 
affect our thoughts or predispositions (i.e., factors), which in turn, affect our 
deceptive behaviors, could prove to be very useful in helping us understand such 
things as when deception is most likely to take place, who is most likely to engage 
in it, and the conditions that make deception most probable.
This kind o f  theoretical understanding could have practical and applied 
implications. For instance, knowledge and foresight of people’s thoughts about 
deception and the common factors or predispositions that influence their 
deceptive communication can serve as very useful information in such contexts as 
workplace settings or employment interviews. Such knowledge may inform 
employers about the deceptive tendencies of potential employees and may aid in 
hiring or promotion decisions. The need for and importance o f honesty and 
integrity measures is very felt in these settings. Workers o f all types and levels 
(e.g., subordinates and superiors) engage in deceptive and dishonest practices in
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order to protect their job security, to preserve their reputation with coworkers and 
superordinates, and to hide theft or losses (Ash, 1971; Bernardin & Cooke, 1993; 
Cunningham et al., 1994). Employers recognize these occurrences and often feel 
the need to be on guard for, prevent, or even predict deceptive behaviors.
This study could expand on the knowledge gained from the use and study 
of other deception-related instruments. The subscales based on the factors in this 
study correlate strongly with the Mach IV Deceit subscale and with the Trust and 
Cynicism subscales o f the Revised Philosophies scale. These subscales could also 
correlate with more specific scales, such as the Reid Report (Reid, 1967), the 
Personnel Selection Inventory (PSl), and the London House Personnel Selection 
Inventory (Terris, 1979; Terris & Jones, 1982), all of which are among the most 
commonly used to assess potential employees’ tendencies toward dishonesty and 
theft. Commonly used deception and integrity scales, such as the Reid Report, 
contain items that relate to specific instances (e.g., “Suppose you found a bag of 
money that fell out o f armored car lying in the street: Would you turn it in or keep 
it for yourself?”). The subscales developed in this study, on the other hand, refer 
more to general feelings and tendencies, which could be more applicable across 
various situations (self-managed teams, romantic relationships, parent-child 
interactions, etc.), not just the workplace setting.
Given the results o f this study, as well as their theoretical and practical 
implications, the possibilities for future research are endless. Aside from the path 
analysis and path model that could be developed, this study takes scholarship in 
directions that lead to the link between attitudes and behavior, or more
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specifically, between the factors that influence our deceptive tendencies and the 
deceptive messages we actually implement. Additionally, this line o f research 
could take scholarship into the realm of study that seeks to understand the pre­
interaction issues related to deception. Buller and Burgoon’s (1996a) 
interpersonal deception theory does take into account such pre-interaction factors 
as expectations, prior knowledge, and communicative repertoire and skills. Such a 
pre-interaction approach to the study of deception could incorporate thought- 
related factors with the pre-interaction factors already studied. Furthermore, this 
approach could supplement our understanding of such phenomena as initial 
interactions, anticipated future interactions, and expectancy violations.
This research report discloses the results o f what was the fourth phase of a 
program o f research intended to explore the factors or thoughts influencing 
deceptive communication. The phases up to this point would still be considered 
rather exploratory in their design and implementation. They have also been fairly 
inductive and still have close ties to their emic, qualitative origins (e.g., focus 
group methods). What this program intends to do in the future is become more 
deductive as it progresses. In doing so, this program will take the information it 
has gleaned and start to approach it from a more empirical, variable-analytic 
perspective. By taking the factors that have now emerged, this program will be 
able to put these factors to more systematic tests and examine them under more 
specific conditions. The ultimate goal of this research program is to answer the 
call for more theoretical work in the area of deception.
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Endnotes
' Please see Scholl and O’Hair (1998) for a more detailed description of the focus 
group interviews and the first factor analysis. Please see Scholl (1999) for a 
description o f the second factor analysis.
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Figure 1
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1988)
Attitude 
Toward the 
Behavior
Subjective
Norm
->■ Behavioral 
Intent
-► Behavior 
y
Perceived
Behavioral
Control
Theory o f Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985)
The solid arrows represent a direct relationship. The broken arrow denotes an 
indirect relationship.
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Figure 2
Factor Loadings in Phases I and II
Before Phase I 
Upbringing -
A fte r Phase T 
Upbringing
Ethics
Motives
Acceptance o f Deception
► Deception is Wrong
Others’ Opinions
^Acceptance of Deception
Intentionality -► Intentionality
This figure represents the emergence of factors during the progression from Phase 
I to Phase II. As the arrows demonstrate. Upbringing and Intentionality emerged 
as the same factor. Acceptance of Deception remained relatively consistent, and 
items that did fit this factor loaded onto other factors. Ethics was relabeled 
Deception is Wrong and items not fitting this factor loaded onto Others’ Opinions 
(the only newly emerging factor). Motives was the only factor that did not emerge 
after Phase I.
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Figure 3
Progression of Exploratory Factor Analysis in Phase I and Phase II
Phase I Phase II
Upbringing ------------------------------------------- ---- ^  Upbringing
D ecep tion  is W rong ___^  Deception is Wrong
Acceptance o f Deception ___^  Acceptance o f Deception
Intentionality ^  Intentionality
Others’ Opinions
Items belonging to Others' Opinions (a factor that emerged at the end o f Phase I) 
did not load onto any retained factors in Phase II.
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APPENDIX A
Personal Information
1. Female  M ale______
2. Age ______
3. Occupation (indicate if  you are a student)
4. Hometown
5. Current religious affiliation (if any)
6. Religious background (if any)
7. Ethnic/cultural group with which you identify
1 2 8
APPENDIX B
Personal Issues Related to Deception
Directions: This study intends to get at the personal thoughts people have about 
deception. Deception can be defined as the act o f  drawing a listener awav from 
what the deceiver believes is the truth.
When reading each statement, decide whether or not you agree or disagree with it, 
given the events you just described. For example, if you really disagree with an 
item, you m ay want to circle "1” or "2". If you really agree with the statement, 
you may want to circle "6" or ”7". Please be as honest and as accurate as possible 
in your responses.
1. Sometimes I have to use deception on the spur o f the moment. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2. I have become very tolerant o f deception. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3. When I deceive someone I know that I am intending to do it. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. My upbringing often motivates me to use deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. My moral stance often allows me to justify deception. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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6. Sometimes I will use deception for my own benefit. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
7. Deception is an acceptable form of communication. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. If 1 were to deceive someone I would have to be aware that I was doing it. 
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. The way I was brought up often motivates me to use deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. There are clear-cut cases when deception is okay. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*11. No matter how a situation is going, 1 would not want to engage in
deception with the other person. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
* 12. Deception is not a significant part of my life. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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13. There are times where I can be in the middle o f saying something and
suddenly realize that I was not telling the truth. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
* 14. What I learned while growing up often keeps me from lying to others. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*15. I have very strong feelings that tell me that deception cannot be ethically 
justified. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*16. I would rather not use deception even if  it’s to benefit the person I am 
deceiving. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*17. I do not see deception as an acceptable form o f communication. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
18. Sometimes I realize that I have deceived someone else only after I had
done it. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
* 19. What I learned fi-om my peers A ^le  growing up often keeps me fi-om
engaging in deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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*20. My moral stance tells me that deception is never okay. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
21. The situation sometimes makes it very easy for some people to deceive 
someone else. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
22. I think that many people feel that deception is sometimes a  necessary evil. 
A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
23. When people truly lie they are totally aware that they are doing it. 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
24. What many people had learned in school often motivates them to lie to 
others. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
25. Many people recognize clear-cut cases when deception is justifiable.
E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
26. Sometimes people use deception if  it will benefit their relationship with 
other people. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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27. Deception is a common communication practice. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
28. When people deceive others it is done consciously, with full awareness of
the act. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
29. What many people have been taught in their households while growing up
motivates them to lie to others. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
30. People generally have very strong feelings that tell them that deception 
can be justified. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*31. M ost people would not use deception even if  it’s to benefit their
relationship with the other person. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*32. Most people do not accept deception as an acceptable communication
practice. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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33. Some people can be in the middle o f a lie and not realize it right away. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*34. What many people have experienced in their household keeps them from 
engaging in deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*35. Most people feel that deception is wrong. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*36. Sometimes the situation makes it difficult for people to deceive the other 
person. M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*37. Most people would not view deception as a necessary evil. A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
38. It is possible for someone to be lying and only realize it after the fact.
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
*39. What people used to leam in school keeps them from lying to others. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
1 3 4
*40. People in general have morals that tell them that deception is not okay. E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
* Indicates reverse coding.
M = Motives 
U = Upbringing 
I = Intentionality 
E = Ethics
A = Acceptance o f Deception
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APPENDIX c
Further Information about the Study:
Relevant Issues Regarding Interpersonal Deception
Thank you for your participation. This study is the fourth phase of a research 
project designed to explore the factors that influence the choices people make 
regarding deceptive communication. So far, this research program has produced 
five factors— upbringing, situation/motives, acceptance o f deception, ethics, and 
intentionality—that may influence when one deceives, who that person deceives, 
and how that deceptive message is formulated. The purpose o f this phase was to 
test the prevalence of these five factors as possible influences— perhaps 
predictors— of deceptive communication. If  you would like to know the results o f  
this study or have additional questions, you can contact Juliaim C. Scholl at:
Department o f Communication 
University of Oklahoma 
101 Burton Hall 
Norman, OK 73019-2081 
(405) 325-3111 
jscholl@ou.edu
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APPENDIX D
Personal Issues Related to Deception—Revised
Directions: This study intends to get at the personal thoughts people have about 
deception. Deception can be defined as the act o f  drawing a listener awav from 
what the deceiver believes is the truth.
With this definition in mind, please respond to the following items. The responses 
range from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). When reading each 
statement, decide whether or not you agree or disagree with it. For example, if 
you really disagree with an item, you may want to circle "1" or "2". If you really 
agree with the statement, you may want to circle "6" or "7". Please be as honest 
and as accurate as possible in your responses.
1. I have very strong feelings that tell me that deception cannot be ethically 
justified. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2. The situation sometimes makes it easy for people to deceive someone else. 
P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3. My upbringing ofien motivates me to use deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. Most people do not accept deception as an acceptable communication 
practice. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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5. There are times when I can be in the middle o f saying something and 
suddenly realize that I was not telling the truth. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
6. 1 would rather not use deception even if  it’s to benefit the person I am 
deceiving. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
7. Sometimes people use deception i f  it will benefit their relationship with 
other people. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. The way 1 was brought up often motivates me to use deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. Most people feel that deception is wrong. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. Sometimes 1 realize that 1 have deceived someone else only after I had 
done it. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. I do not see deception as an acceptable form of communication. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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12. Deception is a common communication practice. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
13. My family has strong feelings about deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. Most people act morally when tempted with deception. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
15. Sometimes I am surprised when I am told that I wasn’t exactly honest with 
someone. I
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
16. My moral stance tells me that deception is never okay. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
17. People use deception for all sorts of reasons. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
18. I was brought up knowing right from wrong when it comes to deception.
U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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19. Most people I know are honest most o f the time. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
20. Sometimes I inadvertently deceive others. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
21. Deceiving someone else is seldom justified. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
22. I know people who use deception in many circumstances. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
23. I had good role models for understanding the consequences o f deception. 
U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
24. I am glad that most people avoid deceptive practices in their lives. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
25. I have been in situations where I wasn’t as honest as I had intended to be. 
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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26. I cannot bring myself to deceive others even if it’s socially justified. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
27. Sometimes people feel that they have no choice but to use deception. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
28. It was continuously stressed when I was growing up that deception was 
unacceptable behavior. U
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
29. Most o f the people I know stress that “honesty is the best policy.” O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
30. In spite o f my best intentions, I sometimes realized that I deceived 
someone. I
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Dis%ree Agree
31. I use deception only as a last resort. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
32. People tell me that they have to use deception in difficult situations. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
1 4 1
33. What I learned in school has influenced what I now believe is right or
wrong about deception. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
34. Most people feel uncomfortable about engaging in deception. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
35. I have caught myself being untruthful without intended to be. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
36. I try very hard not to use deception. D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
37. Deception is a part o f most people’s everyday lives. P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
38. My family taught me a lot about whether deception is right or wrong. U
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
39. People I come in contact with would hardly ever engage in deception. O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
1 4 2
40. I have deceived someone else without being aware that I was doing so. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
D = Deception is Bad 
P = Prevalence 
U = Upbringing
0  = Others’ Opinions
1 = Intentionality
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APPENDIX E 
M achIV
Listed below are a number o f statements. Each represents a commonly held 
opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with 
some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with such matters o f opinion.
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree by circling the number in front of each statement. First impressions are 
usually best in such matters. Read each statement, decide if  you agree or disagree 
and the strength of your opinion, and then circle the appropriate number in front 
of the statement. Give your opinion on every statement.
If you find that the numbers to be used in answering do not adequately indicate 
your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to
do so.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
*3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree D is^ree
Strongly Strongly
*4. Most people are basically good and kind.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
1 4 4
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come
out when they are given a chance.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
*6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
*7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
8. Generally speaking, people won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do
so.
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
*9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and 
dishonest.
+3 +2 4-1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
* 10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best give the real
reason for wanted it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.
4-3 4-2 4-1 -1  -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
*11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
4-3 4-2 4-1 -1 -2 -3
Agree Disagree
Strongly Strongly
1 4 5
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
'17.
18.
Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
+2 +1 -1+3
Agree
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the 
criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
+3
Agree
Strongly
4-2 4-1 -1
Most people are brave.
4-3 4-2 4-1
Agree
Strongly
-1
It is wise to flatter important people.
4-3 4-2 4-1 -1
Agree
Strongly
It is possible to be good in all respects.
4-3 4-2 4-1 -1
Agree
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
Bamum was wrong when he said that there’s a sucker bom every minute. 
4-2 +l  -14-3
Agree
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
It is hard to get ahead without cutting comers here and there. 
4-2 4-1 -14-3
Agree
Strongly
-2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
1 4 6
19. People su£fering from incurable diseases should have the choice o f being 
put painlessly to death.
+3
Agree
Strongly
+2 +1 -1 -2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
20. Most people forget more easily the death o f their father than the loss of 
their property.
+3
Agree
Strongly
+2 +1 ■1 -2 -3
Disagree 
Strongly
Original
Score
Rescore Reversed
+3
+2
+1
-1
-2
-3
7
6
5
3
2
1
1
2
3
5
6 
7
* Denotes reverse coding
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APPENDIX F
Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale
This questionnaire is a series o f attitude statements. Each represents a commonly 
held opinion, and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree 
with some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with matters o f opinion.
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree by circling a  number for each statement. First impressions are usually 
best in such matters. Read each statement, decide if  you agree or disagree and 
determine the strength o f your opinion, and then circle the appropriate number on 
the answer sheet. Be sure to answer every statement If  you find the numbers to be 
used in answering do not adequately indicate your opinion, use the one closest to 
the way you feel.
1. If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure that they 
would not be seen, they would do it. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
2. Most people have the courage o f their convictions. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
3. The average person is conceited. C
-3 -2 -1 +I +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
4. Most people try to apply the Golden Rule, even in today’s complex 
society. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
1 4 8
5. Most people would stop and help a person whose car was disabled. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly • Strongly
6. The typical student will cheat on a test when everybody else does, even 
though he/she has a set o f ethical standards. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
7. Most people do not hesitate to go out o f their way to help someone in 
trouble. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
8. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
9. It’s pathetic to see an unselfish person in today’s world, because so many 
people take advantage o f  him/her. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
10. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is a motto that most 
people follow. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
11. People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and 
morality, but few people stick to them when the chips are down. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
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12. Most people will speak out for what they believe in. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
13. People pretend to care more about one another than they really do. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
14. People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better 
off by lying. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
15. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. 
C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
16. Most people would cheat on their income tax if  they had the chance. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
17. Most people will stick to their opinions if they think they’re right, even if  
others disagree. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
18. Most people will act as “Good Samaritans” if  given the opportunity. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
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19. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they're afraid o f 
getting caught. C
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
20. The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems o f others. T
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Disagree Agree
Strongly Strongly
C = Cynicism 
T = Trust
1 5 1
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics o f Phase I Respondents
Hometown (Place o f origin) Percent N
Southwest U.S. 63.2 216
Midwest U.S. 19.9 68
West coast U.S. 3.8 13
Southeast U.S. 2.1 7
Northeast U.S. .9 3
Mountain Region o f U.S. 5.4 18
Other countries 5.4 18
Occupation Percent N
College/university student 74.3 254
Metropolitan members 25.4 85
Ethnic/cultural Groun Percent N
Euro-American, White, etc. 61.2 209
African American, etc. 2.3 15
American Indian, etc. 4.1 14
Mexican-American, etc. 2.9 10
Asian American 2.4 8
Middle East 1.8 6
Other 9.8 33
Left item blank 13.7 47
Current Religious AfGliation Percent N
Protestant 39.8 136
Non-denom. Christian 18.2 62
Roman Catholic 14.0 48
Other religions 6.6 22
No religious affiliation 9.9 34
Left item blank 12.6 43
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Table 2
Phase I Factor Loadings
Item FI F2 F3 F4 F5
Sometimes I have to use deception on the .607 
spur o f  the moment.
.343 .234 -.131 .087
I have very strong feelings that deception 
cannot be ethically justified.
.735 .082 .177 .120 .004
I would rather not use deception even if  
it's to benefit the person I am 
deceiving.
.646 -.034 .011 .087 .046
I do not see deception as an acceptable 
form o f  communication.
.781 -.011 .175 .180 .090
My moral stance tells me that deception 
is never okay.
.806 .056 .150 .143 -.063
The situation sometimes makes it easy 
for people to deceive someone else.
.041 .727 -.026 -.046 .026
Sometimes people use deception if  it 
will benefit their relationship with 
other people.
-.085 .760 -.069 .054 -.013
Deception is a common communication 
practice.
.236 .647 -.038 .256 -.042
My upbringing often motivates me to 
use deception.
.301 -.086 .759 .033 -.090
The way I was brought up often 
motivates me to use deception.
.284 -.051 .780 .105 .008
Most people do not accept deception as 
an acceptable communication practice.
.237 .135 -.070 .721 -.017
Most people feel that deception is wrong. .115 .001 .105 .762 .047
There are times when I can be in the 
middle o f  saying something and 
suddenly realize that I was not 
telling the truth.
.022 .014 .018 .045 .808
Sometimes I realize that I have deceived • 
someone else only after I had done it.
.049 .051 -.012 -.044 .838
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Table 3
Demographic Characteristics o f Phase II Respondents
Occunation Percent N
College/university student 89.4 287
Metropolitan member 9.0 30
Hometown fPlace o f orisinl Percent N
Southwest U.S. 82.8 266
Northeast U.S. 2.7 9
U.S. Mountain Region 2.4 8
Midwest U.S. 2.1 7
West coast U.S. 1.8 6
Southeast U.S. 1.8 6
Outside the U.S. 4.9 16
Left item blank .9 3
Current Religious Affiliation Percent N
Protestant 44.5 143
Non-dem. Christian 20.6 66
Roman Catholic 10.9 33
Other 5.7 19
No religious affiliation 11.2 36
F.thnic/cultural Group Percent N
Euro-American, White, etc. 67.6 217
Afiican American, etc. 9.0 29
Hispanic, etc. 1.6 5
American Indian 1.6 5
Asian-American 1.6 5
Bi-racial, various 2.4 8
Asian, Pacific Islander 2.4 8
Other 3.0 11
No group aftiliation 1.6 5
Left item blank 5.3 17
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Table 4
Item-Factor Loadings for Phase II—Exploratory Factor Analysis
Item F I F2 F3 F4
There are times when I can be in the middle of 
saying something and suddenly realize that I 
was not telling the truth.
.766 -.096 -.034 -.130
Sometimes I realize that I have deceived some­
one else only after I had done it.
.812 -.037 -.044 -.030
Sometimes I inadvertently deceive others. .725 -.099 .335 -.051
In spite of my best intentions, I sometimes 
realized that I deceived someone.
.712 -.110 .337 -.032
I have caught myself being untruthful without 
intending to be.
.859 -.042 .125 -.014
I have deceived someone else without being 
aware that I was doing it.
.779 -.034 -.033 -.064
I would rather not use deception even if it’s to 
benefit the person I am deceiving.
-.025 .746 -.055 .040
I do not see deception as an acceptable form of 
communication.
-.007 .658 -.117 .142
My moral stance tells me that deception is never 
okay.
-.024 .708 -.004 .162
Deceiving someone else is seldom justified. -.004 .603 -.030 -.061
I cannot bring myself to deceive others even if 
it’s socially justified.
-.166 .638 -.222 .155
I try very hard not to use deception. -.004 .657 -.011 .272
Deception is a common communication 
practice.
.075 -.035 .616 -.009
People use deception for all sorts of reasons. -.017 .029 .630 -.001
I know people who use deception in many 
circumstances.
.250 -.003 .617 .134
Sometimes people feel that they have no 
choice but to use deception.
-130 -.139 .609 .003
I was brought up knowing right from wrong 
when it comes to deception.
.034 .206 .036 .714
I had good role models for understanding the 
consequences o f deception.
.040 .095 .024 .786
My family taught me a lot about whether 
deception is right or wrong.
-.070 .225 .031 .758
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Table 4 (continued)
Item-Factor Loadings for Phase II— Exploratory Factor Analysis
FI = Intentionality 
F2 = Deception is Wrong 
F3 = Acceptance of Deception 
F4 = Upbringing
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Table 5
Factor Correlation Matrix for “Intentionality” Subscale (N = 321)
5 10 20 30 35 40
5 X
10 .604* X
20 .556* .544* X
30 .500* .505* .643* X
35 .606* .595* .621* .630* X
40 .441* .588* .494* .472* .676* X
* Denotes correlation is significant at the .01 level.
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Table 6
Factor Correlation Matrix for “Deception is Wrong” Subscale (N = 321)
6 11 16 21 26 36
6 X
11 .512* X
16 .429* .433* X
21 .372* .342* .430* X
26 .425* .398* .413* .389* X
36 .379* .427* .485* .329* .378 X
Denotes correlation is significant at the .01 level.
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Table 7
Factor Correlation Matrix for “Acceptance o f Deception” Subscale (N = 321)
12 17 22 27
12 X
17 .290* X
22 .327* .381* X
27 .245* .312* .312* X
* Denotes correlation is significant at the .01 level.
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Table 8
Factor Correlation Matrix for “Upbringing” Subscale (N = 321)
18 23 38
18 X
23 .485* X
38 .581* .553* X
* Denotes correlation is significant at the .01 level.
1 6 1
Table 9
Item-Factor Correlation Matrix for “Intentionality” Subscale—Confirmatory
Factor Analysis (N = 321)
5 10 20 30 35 40
5 .71 .07 .02 .03 .01 .06
10 .60 .75 .01 .06 .05 .07
20 .56 .54 .76 .07 .03 .04
30 .50 .50 .64 .75 .02 .13
35 .61 .60 .62 .63 .86 .08
40 .44 .59 .49 .47 .68 .70
Bold -faced figures in diagonal are factor loadings.
Figures below the diagonal are correlation coefficients. 
Figures above the diagonal are standard error terms.
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Table 10
Item-Factor Correlation Matrix for “Deception is Wrong” Subscale
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (N = 321)
6 11 16 21 26 36
6 .67 .07 .04 .01 .02 .04
11 .51 .66 .03 .04 .09 .02
16 .43 .43 .70 .03 .02 .06
21 .37 .34 .43 .57 .04 .02
26 .43 .40 .41 .39 .62 .01
36 .38 .43 .49 .33 .38 .62
Bold -faced figures in diagonal are factor loadings.
Figures below the diagonal are correlation coefficients. 
Figures above the diagonal are standard error terms.
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Table 11
Item-Factor Correlation Matrix for “Acceptance o f  Deception” Subscalc
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (N = 321)
12 17 22 27
12 .50 .01 .01 .01
17 .29 .60 .01 .01
22 .33 .38 .64 .01
27 .25 .31 .31 .50
Bold-faced figures in diagonal are factor loadings. 
Figures below the diagonal are correlation coefficients. 
Figures above the diagonal are standard error terms.
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Table 12
Item-Factor Correlation Matrix for “Upbringing” Subscale—Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (N = 321)
18 23 38
18 .83 .19 .13
23 .49 .82 .15
38 .58 .55 .85
Bold-faced figures in diagonal are factor loadings. 
Figures below the diagonal are correlation coefficients. 
Figures above the diagonal are standard error terms.
165
Table 13
Correlation Matrix o f Mach IV Subscales, Revised Philosophies o f Human Nature 
Subscales, and CFA Subscales (N = 321)
DEC TRU CYN INT WRO ACC UPB
DEC XXX 
XXX
TRU -.020 XXX 
.723 XXX
CYN .123* -.340 XXX
.027 .000 XXX
INT -.014 -.115* .284 XXX
.804 .040 .000 XXX
WRO -.445 .166 -.255
.000 .003 .000
ACC .060 -.221 .228
.283 .000 .000
UPB -.196 .108 -.080
.000 .053 .153
* Indicates significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Italics indicate significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table lists correlations among the Mach IV subscale Deceit (DEC), the Trust 
(TRU) and Cynicism (CYN) subscales o f the Revised Philosophies scale, and the 
factors “Intentionality” (INT), “Deception is Wrong” (WRO), “Acceptance of 
Deception” (ACC), and “Upbringing” (UPB).
-.131* XXX
.019 XXX
.324 -.146 XXX
.000 .009 XXX
-.044 .410 .087 XXX
.428 .000 .119 XXX
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Table 14
Descriptive Statistics for Mach IV Deceit Subscale, Revised Philosophies Trust 
and Cynicism Subscales, and the Revised Deception Subscales (N = 321)
Standard
Mean______________Deviation
DEC 7.162 1.845
TRU 2.770 9.395
CYN 6.100 9.372
INT 23.791 8.1760
WRO 29.592 6.814
ACC 20.788 3.830
UPB 17.090 3.350
DEC = Deceit subscale o f Mach IV scale
TRU = Trust subscale of Revised Philosophies of Human Nature scale
CYN = Cynicism subscale of Revised Philosophies o f  Human Nature scale
INT = Intentionality
WRO = Deception is Wrong
ACC = Acceptance o f Deception
UPB = Upbringing
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